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The 9/11 Commission Report called for consolidation of intelligence assets in 
order to unify the knowledge base of the intelligence community agencies. This concept 
gave rise to the fusion center as a place for the fusion of multiple information sources 
from local, state, and federal levels of government. Although the need for inclusion of 
health and medical information in fusion centers has been documented, relatively few 
have done so, and a product designed specifically toward health and medical intelligence 
currently does not exist at the state and local level. The purpose of this paper is to 
document a methodology for development of a health threat assessment as a means for 
the intelligence community to maintain a decision advantage, particularly at the state and 
local level where the intelligence developed will provide the most benefit to first 
responders and the local community. This model demonstrates the need for the public 
health and medical community to improve collaboration across sectors to produce a more 
integrated product that enhances the understanding of the entire community, thus 
developing qualia. This can only be accomplished through trust, complete transparency, 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Suddenly, unexpectedly, I had this incredible revelation. 
          — Andrew Wiles, on discerning the proof of Fermat’s last theorem 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Chaos may be one way to describe what happened in our government after the 
attacks on this country on September 11, 2001. However, the study of chaos theory 
shows that if the essential aspects of chaos are broken down into their smallest elements, 
we can find patterns amidst the flurry. A flap of a butterfly’s wings may not really be 
capable of creating a tornado (Lorenz, 1972),1 but the chaos theory principle of “sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions,” forces us to reevaluate the process by which we 
develop intelligence. In doing so, we may be able to see patterns not seen before, thereby 
allowing us to get inside the enemy’s decision cycle to prevent the next terrorist attack. In 
reevaluating our intelligence development process, we were called to think anew. In 
doing so, some states created intelligence fusion centers. The inception of these centers 
resulted from dual incentives; the responsibility for major portions of homeland security 
being pushed down to the state and local level, and dissatisfaction with the threat 
information that the federal government was providing to the states. As of March 2008, 
there were 58 fusion centers located in states and large cities (Department of Homeland 
Security [DHS], n.d.). However, the effectiveness of their products has been the subject 
of significant debate. Critics speculate that many of the products from these fusion 
centers are nothing more than newspaper clippings (Brueggemann, 2008, p. 14). A lack 
of analysis regarding the pertinence of the information to the locality and a failure to 
include disciplines other than law enforcement is prominent in the criticism. Our  
 
 
                                                 
1 This concept is attributed to Edward Lorenz for a presentation he gave entitled Predictability: Does 
the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas? During a conference of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, D.C., December 1972.  
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challenge now is to refine the fusion concept by creating qualia through trust and 
collaboration in the intelligence development process. This will be discussed further in 
subsequent chapters. 
1.  Background 
The 9/11 Commission Report called for consolidation of intelligence assets at the 
national level in order to unify the knowledge base of the intelligence community 
agencies in a network-based, information-sharing system. The purpose of this system 
would be to create a synergy of information whose whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 394).  
Having raised this issue to the forefront of the counterterrorism effort, many local and 
state law enforcement agencies broadened the scope of their intelligence activities to 
include federal intelligence information as well as other public and private sector data. 
This trend gave rise to the fusion center concept as a place for the integration and fusion 
of multiple sources of information from local, state, and federal levels of government.  
The Department of Justice (DOJ) Fusion Center Guidelines (2006, p. 2) define a 
fusion center as “a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, 
expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to 
detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.” In support of 
state and local agencies taking on this effort, Abbot and Hetzel (2005, p. xix) state,  
The fundamental responsibility of the government is the protection of the 
lives, health and welfare of its people. Incumbent in this mandate is the 
responsibility of state and local governments to protect residents not only 
from criminal and terrorist acts, a responsibility normally associated with 
law enforcement, but also from naturally occurring threats and disasters. 
Public health related intelligence can play a critical role in protection from 
all of these threats. 
The need for collaboration between law enforcement and health and medical 
officials in both deterring and investigating crime has been addressed extensively in the 
literature. Richards (2002) provides an excellent discussion on this topic. 
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Public health officials can respond quickly to an indentified threat and can 
conduct investigations without the limitations of probable-cause 
warrants… Information from public health investigations may be used in 
criminal investigations if two criteria are met. First, the information must 
be collected and processed with a proper chain of custody so that it can be 
authenticated by an expert and admitted into evidence…Second, the 
evidence must be obtained as part of a legitimate public health 
investigation. For example, food samples taken during an investigation of 
food poisoning at a picnic could be used in a subsequent criminal trial if 
the food was found to be intentionally contaminated (Bioterrorism 
Investigations). 
The Congressional Research Service report, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options 
for Congress, holds that stakeholders, such as public health, emergency responders, and 
the private sector, are crucial to developing an accurate picture of the threat to 
jurisdictions (Masse, O’Neil, Rollins, 2007, pp. 5-6). In addition, Butler, Cohen, 
Friedman, Scripp and Watz (2002, p. 1155) stress the significance of coordination 
between public health and law enforcement in bioterrorism planning.  
Dr. Jeffery Runge (2008, Threat Awareness), the Assistant Secretary for Health 
Affairs in the Department of Homeland Security, emphasized that his office is 
responsible for the development of biological threat awareness by developing and 
maintaining intelligence sources. Runge (2008) states in his UASI Keynote Address:  
The Department of Homeland Security is doing a lot in the area of threat 
awareness.  The Office of Health Affairs works closely with the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, who in turn work with the broader Intelligence 
Community, as well as law enforcement at the state and local levels. The 
Department is working closely with State Fusion Centers to monitor and 
integrate threat information – with 58 Centers around the country the 
Department has provided more than $254 million from FY 2004-2007 to 
state and local governments to support these Centers. Fusion Centers are 
critical to our mission of preventing an attack from happening in the first 
place.  Good intelligence information is really the only method we have 
today to stop a biological attack from happening in the first place (Threat 
Awareness). 
Although the need for inclusion of health and medical information and analysts in 
fusion centers has been documented, relatively few fusion centers have actually done so. 
In March 2007, Morrissey (2007) documented that only six fusion centers, three 
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Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEWG) and three Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) 
had some type of health or medical representation (p. 27). This evidence demonstrates 
that currently there is a gap in the ability of state, local, and tribal levels of government to 
protect their emergency responders, law enforcement personnel, and residents from 
health related threats. The gap derives from a failure to include health information in the 
fusion process. Even those that do include health data have yet to develop a routine 
process for development of an integrated health threat assessment based upon relevant 
health and medical data that is available through health departments, other governmental 
agencies, and the private sector. This assessment can provide the intelligence necessary to 
develop appropriate protective actions in either natural disasters or criminal/terrorist 
incidents.  
Despite the amount of effort applied to prevention, however, the possibility exists 
that a terrorist attack may still occur. When this happens, the health sector can also play a 
critical role, whether the event is an overt attack, such as the 1995 sarin attack in the 
Tokyo subway, or a covert attack, such as the 2001 anthrax attacks in Washington, D.C. 
In overt attacks, the input from public health usually is evident in the mitigation mode 
during emergency response after detection of the incident. In the covert mode, public 
health epidemiological surveillance may be the first method of detection that an attack 
has occurred. This early response must focus on diagnosis and medical care. The fact that 
criminal intent was involved may not be evident immediately; therefore, epidemiological 
investigation is vital to its discovery (Butler et al., 2002, p. 1152). Epidemiological 
investigations look across jurisdictions for patterns of illness that may give clues 
regarding the location where the incident occurred.  These investigations are also critical 
in identifying other individuals that my have been exposed during the event, which will 
mitigate the degree of illness or fatality rate associated with the incident. Whether overt 
or covert, health threat assessments are critical components in prevention and response 
for minimizing casualties. 
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2.  Health Threat Assessment 
A health threat assessment is an estimate of the possible diseases and/or injuries 
that could occur through recognition of sentinel events or patterns within data that 
provide indications of impending harm (Devon & Cornwall Constabulary Glossary, 
2008). Like an intelligence threat assessment, the health threat assessment could be one 
of the building blocks in the prevention of terrorist attacks and the mitigation of 
casualties after an attack. It can also assist in developing policy and response plans.  
The health threat assessment is not a new concept. The Department of Defense 
commonly uses this process to ensure the protection of service personnel upon 
deployment to overseas locations. According to the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence 
Center (AFMIC), Medical Intelligence Tutorial (2000, p. 4), the assessment consists of a 
variety of factors categorized according to three major categories: infectious disease and 
environmental health, medical capabilities, and life sciences and technologies. Although 
all three of these categories are important, the aspect that will have the greatest threat to 
first responders is the category of infectious disease and environmental health. This 
category includes types of infectious diseases considered to be of operational importance 
either because they are diseases that already exist in the region or because terrorists could 
introduce these types of infectious diseases as weapons. They include zoonotic associated 
diseases such as anthrax, food, and water-borne diseases such as cholera, respiratory 
diseases such as Tuberculosis (TB), sexually transmitted and blood-borne diseases such 
as Hepatitis, vector-borne diseases such as West Nile Fever, as well as other infectious 
diseases such as Ebola-Marburg viral disease. The second part of this category includes 
environmental factors that can affect the health of our workforce and residents, such as 
environmental pollution from contamination of our air, food, water, and soil with toxic 
substances (AFMIC, 2000, pp. 9-10, 12). 
The obstacles to the development of a comprehensive health threat assessment are 
represented by the complex nature of accessibility of the information systems and the 
number of possible data sources. Natarajan (2007) listed 25 types of data points that 
would have an impact on the health threat (pp. 47-48).  This data exists in a variety of 
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formats, which adds to the complexity of the problem. Some information is stored 
electronically in databases while other information is collected manually on an as-needed 
basis. Information sources range from local government agencies to federal government 
agencies to private sector entities. Confounding the usefulness of the information is that 
no single agency aggregates this information for consolidated analysis. Appendix A 
depicts this information in table format. Without fusion and analysis, the information 
lacks credible predictive value. 
The large number of sources and types of information at the local, state, and 
federal levels demonstrates the complexity of the problem and the imperative to develop 
a health threat assessment at the state and local level. The development of a 
comprehensive health threat assessment has not become a standard practice within public 
health across the country; however, to comply with Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive #8, state and local fusion centers need to commit to this initiative in order to 
strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities. According to the DHS 
(2005) Capability-Specific Priorities delineated in Interim National Preparedness Goal, 
3.2.1., one of the national priorities is to “strengthen information sharing and 
collaboration capabilities to enable effective prevention, protection, response, and 
recovery activities” (p. 12). A comprehensive health threat assessment can contribute 
substantially to those four phases of preparedness. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will address the question: What is a methodology for developing an 
integrated health threat assessment? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis adds to the national discussion on intelligence issues in state and local 
fusion centers.  Much of the current debate about the fusion centers pertains to the ability 
to develop intelligence products that have in-depth analysis and provide estimates of the 
current threat to local jurisdictions. This thesis presents a possible model for the 
development of a health threat assessment for use by local and state fusion centers as an 
 7
element of a comprehensive threat assessment. This discussion adds a new philosophical 
perspective to intelligence analysis through discussion of the concept of qualia in the  
fusion process. The outcome of this research advances the discussion on improving our 
ability to protect our homeland through the inclusion of health and medical data and the 
philosophical construct of qualia when developing intelligence threat assessments. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.  Health Threat Assessment 
The literature in the field of health threat assessment is limited but growing. 
Currently, the literature is almost exclusively restricted to references surrounding military 
operations. Military documentation uses the terminology “medical threat assessment,” 
which is a commonly used process in the Department of Defense for ensuring the 
protection of service personnel upon deployment to overseas locations (AFMIC, 2000, p. 
4).  The combination of these data elements is intended to provide the military medical 
planner with the intelligence necessary to develop recommendations for immunizations, 
level of protective clothing and uniforms, and pharmaceutical prophylaxis to achieve the 
best protection of the deploying force.   
Colonel Robert DeFraites (2007), the Preventive Medicine Consultant to The 
Surgeon General of the United States Army, published an article on medical situational 
awareness during the COBRA GOLD 2006 Command Post Exercise in Thailand (p. 
1071). DeFraites (2007) argues that the resultant positive outcomes from developing 
medical situational awareness are that 
This information supports effective and timely decision-making. This 
ensures that (1) health hazards can be anticipated and protective actions 
taken; (2) personnel exposed to CBRN, occupational, and naturally 
occurring environmental threats can be located, informed and treated; and 
(3) operational plans can be appropriately adjusted in a timely fashion, in 
collaboration with partner organizations, such as coalition forces and 
nongovernmental organizations. (p. 1072) 
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Despite the somewhat limited focus from the military perspective, even less has 
been done to develop a similar health threat assessment for state and local public health 
officials relative to their development of the same type of protective action 
recommendations, treatment when necessary, and alteration of plans based upon the 
existing threat. The current literature, however, contains complementary information in 
the development of key concepts that give credence to the importance of the development 
of a health threat assessment. These three other areas of study include the development of 
intelligence threat assessments, recognition of indicators and warnings, and public health 
assessments of specific populations for identification of chronic disease or medical 
conditions.   
2.  Intelligence Threat Assessment 
The literature surrounding threat assessments is expansive and covers topics such 
as 
• National security challenges to the United States in the Annual Threat 
Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence (McConnell, 2007).  
• Models for developing threat assessments for schools such as A Guide to 
Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates 
by the U.S. Secret Service and the Department of Education (Fein et al., 
2002).   
• Air and maritime domain threat assessments from Transportation Security 
Administration (2004), such as Security Threat Assessment for Aircraft 
Operators and Heliport Operators and their Employees that Conduct Air 
Tour Operations in New York City.   
• Computer network security, such as Danforth’s Models for Threat 
Assessment in Networks (2006). 
• Nuclear and biological terrorism threat assessments, such as the 
Bioterrorism and Threat Assessment (Ackerman and Moran, 2006) 
published by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which was 
sponsored by the United Nations. 
Each of these publications is specific to a particular aspect of homeland security, and all 
could have some impact on the public health of a community; however, none specifically 
addresses the health aspect of the threat. 
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3.  Indicators and Warnings 
Research has also been conducted in the area of indicators and warnings, 
primarily in the strategic sense.  The literature reveals a body of work in the 1970s and 
1980s regarding the intelligence community and its ability or failure to interpret threat 
indications and warnings accurately prior to enemy attacks. Belden (1977) states, “The 
warning process – whose primary elements are indicators, analysis, decision, and action – 
is conceptualized in interaction terms and further specified using the notion of actor’s 
decision stairways” (p. 181). More recently, the Department of Homeland Security 
distinguishes between intelligence and information gathering in the Target Capabilities 
List published in September 2007. The Information Gathering and Recognition of 
Indicators and Warnings capability definition states: 
Unlike intelligence collection, information gathering is the continual 
gathering of only pure, unexamined data, not targeted collection 
traditionally conducted by the intelligence community or targeted 
investigations. Recognition of indicators and warnings is the ability to see 
in this gathered data the potential trends, indicators, and/or warnings of 
criminal and/or terrorist activities (including planning and surveillance) 
against U.S. citizens, government entities, critical infrastructure, and/or 
our allies. (p. 81) 
The Department of Homeland Security (2007) also published an Exercise Evaluation 
Guide on Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings as a part of 
its Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program (HSEEP). This guide provides a 
listing of homeland security information gathering and recognition tasks and observations 
evaluators should assess for during an exercise. However, both the target capability and 
the guide are almost exclusively geared toward law enforcement. Although both 
documents reference “other appropriate agencies” (DHS, HSEEP, p. 3), they do not 
provide specific tasks that should be conducted by other types of agencies. 
4.  Health Risk Assessment 
The third area of the literature closely aligned with health threat assessments is 
that of population health assessments and health risk assessments. These studies are 
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geared traditionally toward assessing the health needs of a community to prioritize health 
care and other interventions.  Health assessment studies are conducted by cities at the 
local level, such as the Community Health Assessment of Kansas City, Missouri 
conducted in 2005, the Health Status Assessment Report 2006 by the Louisville Metro 
Health Department, and the RAND Report on Assessing Health and Health Care in the 
District of Columbia, published in 2007 (Lurie et al.). These studies provide assessments 
of the health indicators of particular populations based on chronic disease registries, 
hospital admission data, and insurance data claims. However, they do not address 
immediate threats to population health that stems from natural events or nefarious 
actions.   
Due to the absence of literature on health threat assessments at the state and local 
level, it is evident that there is a gap in the development of threat assessments. The 
related literature suggests the need for a public health version of a threat assessment 
based upon indications and warnings. Recognition of these indicators is critical in 
enabling public health officials to make recommendations regarding actions necessary to 
protect first responders and the public. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
The greatest obstacle to discovery is not ignorance – it is the illusion of 
knowledge. 
                                          — Daniel Boorstin, Librarian of Congress, 1984 
A. MULTITIERED APPROACH TO GROUNDED THEORY 
The methodology used for this research is based upon grounded theory, which 
was developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). This theory assumes the ability of the 
researcher to discover theory based on data sampling. As such, instead of gathering data 
to prove a hypothesis, the researcher develops theory through a looping process of 
analyzing data for ideas that generate further data gathering until a saturation point is 
reached. The point at which the researcher achieves saturation will vary from study to 
study, but it is achieved when the data reveals no new information about the particular 
subject. This methodology is an effective way for social scientists to develop existing 
theory further (pp. 45-77). 
The multitiered methodology used in this study is not universally accepted. 
Mingers (2001) discusses the concept of combining research methods within the 
information systems realm. His research documents the fact that although some work 
specifically documents a pluralist methodology, this occurs rarely. However, when 
reviewing the actual procedures used by many authors, the combination of methodologies 
was apparent (p. 246). The argument in favor of using a multitiered approach is that 
information systems are much more than simply the information technology that provides 
their basis. In fact, information systems instead reflect the whole of human 
communication, including factors such as “psychology, economics, sociology, 
mathematics, linguistics and semiotics,” all of which use very different research methods 
(Mingers, 2001, p. 252). Because of the similarity between information technology 
systems and intelligence development, this study’s methodology is based on a multitiered 
research approach. This study uses a sequential research design as documented by  
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Mingers (2001, p. 252). This methodology employs different research techniques in a 
sequential manner, the first providing information for the second, and then the second 
feeding information to the third (Mingers, 2001, p. 246). 
Due to the complexity of the subject and the limited documentation in the field of 
this study, the research methodology used was a triangulation approach that combined a 
survey instrument and interviews.  The process of triangulation allows the use of a 
variety of research methodologies to develop and validate data that may not be obtainable 
with just one methodology (Oliver-Hoyo and Allen, 2006, pp. 42-47). Triangulation is a 
data saturation process that involves approaching the data gathering effort from the use of 
three methodologies when no single method would be sufficient. In this study, 
triangulation occurred from gathering data through a survey instrument, validation of that 
data through structured interviews, which were then followed up by less structured 
interviews that considered the entire information flow process. 
The initial research effort was focused on data gathering using a survey and 
interviews. The purpose of the survey instrument was to ascertain the types of data 
elements available to public health professionals in the National Capital Region that 
could provide health specific situational awareness. In addition, the survey was used to 
determine the format in which the data is collected and stored. An understanding of the 
types of information technology systems used by the various agencies with health data to 
collect, store, and analyze data was essential to determining the appropriate information 
process flow for the development of an integrated health threat assessment. The second 
step in the survey process was to interview personnel who develop or maintain the data to 
verify the data elements discovered from the survey.   
Once the researcher was satisfied that the data gathering effort was saturated, a 
model was developed to depict the various data elements involved, the information flow, 
the fusion process, product development, and finally, the product dissemination. 
The final step in this research process was to conduct interviews. The purpose of 
the interviews was to validate the data source information and the information process 
flow model for the development of a health threat assessment. Interviews were conducted 
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using subject matter experts in the field of both homeland security intelligence and public 
health. This triangulation approach provided validation concerning saturation of the data 
gathering effort. 
B. DATA GATHERING 
1. Survey 
The survey instrument, designed using the automated survey tool provided by 
SurveyMonkey, was an electronic questionnaire comprised of a combination of 
structured and unstructured questions. A copy of the survey is included in Appendix B. 
The survey’s respondents were a variety of public health professionals serving primarily 
in the federal or state levels of government, who currently collect or process health or 
medical data listed in Annex A. Examples of these professionals are experts in pre-
hospital care, epidemiologists involved in syndromic surveillance, and those involved in 
animal disease control or vector-borne disease control. In addition, individuals 
responsible for biological and chemical surveillance programs at both state and federal 
levels were surveyed as well. Other professionals surveyed were those involved in food 
inspection, poison control, and air, water, and soil sampling. The surveys were distributed 
via email. Annex B contains a copy of the SurveyMonkey instrument that was used.  
2. Interviews 
To enhance saturation of the data, interviews were conducted with individuals 
who had similar responsibilities. Questions similar to those in the automated survey were 
used during this interview process; however, the interviewees were provided with a 
listing of the data sources that had been developed through the survey process, and the 
questions were generalized to all public health organizations rather than their specific 
organizations. These interviews were conducted either telephonically or in person. The 




through the survey. Because of the oral nature of the interviews, the survey participants 
provided more detail during their discussion for the unstructured questions. This helped 
to provide greater data saturation. 
C. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
1. Model Development 
Upon completion of the first phase of research, a knowledge flow model was 
developed demonstrating the types of data available as well as a possible information 
flow process in the development of a health threat assessment. The model uses four of the 
five elements documenting the process presented by Zhuge (2002, p. 25), including 
information accumulation, classification, abstraction, and analogy.  
The model was not focused exclusively on the discrete aspects of information 
flow; rather, it addressed as well the abstract concepts of information fusion. 
Development of the model was accomplished after conducting a review of the literature 
on various models in use in intelligence development and decision making. A 
combination of theory and documented process was used as the basis for the model.  
2. Interviews 
Upon completion of the model design, interviews were then conducted to 
ascertain the validity of the process flow. Interview questions and a copy of the model 
were provided to interviewees in advance of the interview. If the interview was 
conducted in person, the individual was provided the information at least two hours in 
advance in hard copy. If the interview was conducted telephonically, the information was 
provided at least 24 hours in advance via email. Appendix C contains a copy of the 
interview questions and the model, which were presented to each individual interviewed. 
For this portion of the research, nine individuals were interviewed. The 




• Four state level Directors of Public Health Preparedness 
• One state level Chief of a Bureau of Epidemiology 
• One Battalion Fire Chief responsible for Special Operations 
• One Level One Trauma Center Emergency Preparedness Coordinator 
• One Critical Infrastructure Program Manager for the Federal Government 
• One Biosurveillance Program Director for the Federal Government 
All of these individuals are familiar with the intelligence cycle or public health. 
Probable stakeholders of a health threat assessment were also included in the interview 
process. Their input was particularly important regarding the usefulness of such a product 
to the public health intelligence consumer. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and 
coded. Using the grounded theory research tenet of adjusting the research effort based on 
data collected during field interviews and observations, additional questions were added 
after the first three interviews due to the emphasis placed on two specific areas by the 
interviewees. These additional questions were developed to gain further information 
regarding the types of knowledge management architecture and intelligence products. 
Based upon information gained in the interviews, the model was modified to incorporate 
new data points and concepts for the information process flow.  
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III. FUSION QUALIA 
At the heart of science is an essential tension between two seemingly 
contradictory attitudes – an openness to new ideas, no matter how bizarre 
or counterintuitive they may be, and the most ruthless skeptical scrutiny of 
all ideas, old and new.  
— Carl Sagan, The Demon Haunted World, 1996 
A. INTELLIGENCE AND FUSION 
This chapter will present various models for intelligence preparation and the 
theory of fusion in the development of intelligence. Based upon these basic models and 
the results of my research, I will present a model for building a health threat assessment 
for use at the state and local levels. 
1. The Intelligence Cycle 
Most texts on intelligence include a discussion on the intelligence cycle or the 
process by which intelligence is produced (Gill and Phythian, 2006, p. 3; Johnson and 
Wirtz, 2008, p. 49; Lowenthal, 2006, p. 65). The Fusion Center Guidelines published by 
the Department of Justice (2006) define the intelligence process as “the means of 
developing raw information into finished intelligence products for use in decision making 
and formulating policies/actions” (p. 24). The cycle used at the strategic level by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (2001, Intelligence Cycle) includes the stages: 
• Planning and Direction. This is not really a single phase of the process, but 
rather is seen as the overall management of the process from collection 
requirements to product dissemination. 
• Collection. This stage involves the collection of data and information, 
which is often termed “raw” intelligence because it has not yet been 
analyzed. 
• Processing and Exploitation. In this stage, the raw intelligence is 
transformed into something that is useable by intelligence analysts through 
processes, such as language translation and de-encryption. 
• Analysis and Production. In the development of intelligence, this is the 
stage at which the experience and training of the analyst is of utmost 
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importance. This stage is the point where raw intelligence becomes 
finished intelligence through an evaluation of the validity and relevance of 
the information in relation to the requirements developed in the planning 
stage. The products that are produced in this stage must be designed to suit 
the desired audiences. 
• Dissemination. This stage is the logical distribution of the finished product 
and a return to the original stage of Planning and Direction. 
Figure 1 depicts the intelligence cycle as described by the Central Intelligence 
Agency in the Factbook on Intelligence. 
 
Figure 1.   The Intelligence Cycle. (From: CIA Factbook on Intelligence, 2001) 
Because there are multiple versions of the intelligence development process in the 
literature, many with a concept variation worth noting, five other versions are presented 
in this discussion. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Intelligence Cycle includes an 
additional step, requirements, which is added prior to planning and direction (Carter, 
2004, p. 65). However, Lowenthal (2006) alters the cycle further with a seven-step 
process by incorporating requirements, but deleting planning and direction, and adding 
the stages of consumption and feedback. He describes the requirements stage as the point 
at which policymakers identify policy issues or decisions about which they expect the 
intelligence products to inform them. The stage of consumption is the reading or 
receiving of the briefing of the finished intelligence product. Once presented, Lowenthal 
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asserts that feedback regarding the quality of the product and the format of presentation is 
critical for analysts to improve their products. Rather than depicting the intelligence cycle 
in the typical round pattern, he depicts the intelligence development process in a linear 
model with multiple layers in order to demonstrate continuous feedback (pp. 54-67). 
Figure 2 depicts the Lowenthal model. 
 
Figure 2.   Intelligence Process – Multilayered. (From:  Lowenthal, 2006, pp. 54-67) 
The Fusion Center Guidelines provide yet another version of the intelligence 
cycle process with a six-step cycle, which incorporates the five steps of the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s model with the addition of the stage of reevaluation. This stage 
assesses new information to determine whether the analyst can use it to validate existing 
analysis or to update or improve previous analysis products (DOJ, 2006, p. 20). Figure 3 
presents the cycle depicted in the Fusion Center Guidelines. 
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Figure 3.   The Intelligence Process from the Fusion Center Guidelines. (From: DOJ, 
2006, p. 20). 
The variability in the documentation of the intelligence cycle demonstrates the 
changing nature of the intelligence development process since 2001. The Henry L. 
Stimson Center documents this change through a comparison of the environmental 
influences that affect the current development of intelligence. Today’s environment 
involves the need to incorporate sensitive and classified information with volumes of 
open source information, both of which are available in a variety of formats, including 
electronic and manually recorded. Another complicating factor is the number of cultures 
now involved in the intelligence collection and development efforts. The Stimson report 
discusses the culture of traditional terrorism relative to intelligence development, along 
with health and natural hazard information cultures (Fisher et al., 2008, p. 5). Table 1 
depicts the five-stage process documented by the Central Intelligence Agency, which 
includes a comparison of the factors that influenced the traditional process with those that 
mandate an evolution in the process.  This comparison documents the increasing 





Traditional Intelligence Cycle Evolving Intelligence Cycle 
Planning & Direction Defined consumers; Formal 
requirements process 
Consumers at multiple levels; 
Conflicting requirements 
Collection Taskings to fill requirements; 
Resource availability and 
adequacy understood 
Top-down requirements/ 





embedded within organizations 
Technical capabilities 




institutionalized and defined 
Analytical processes based on 
different professional 
expectations 
Dissemination Well-defined products and list 
of cleared recipients 
Varied products with complex 
security needs 
Table 1.   Evolving Influences on Intelligence Development. (From: Fisher et al., 2008, 
pp. 7-8). 
Not only does the external environment have a significant effect on the 
intelligence process, the intelligence process also has an effect on the environment in 
which it exists. Based upon the concept of the “funnel of causality” first made popular by 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, Stokes (1980, p. 24), Gill and Phythian (2006) developed a 
model for the intelligence process that emphasizes the outcomes of the action taken based 
upon the finished intelligence product. They point out that the funnel shape illustrates that 
the analysis process filters out a great deal of the raw intelligence data that incorporates 
the input into the initial process (p. 3).  Their model is depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.   Gill and Phythian Funnel of Causality Intelligence Process (From: Gill and 
Phythian, 2006, p. 3) 
2. The Fusion Process 
Based on the number of different models depicting the intelligence process and 
the variety of factors chosen for emphasis in each model, the complexity involved in this 
process is evident. The National Governor’s Association 2007 survey of homeland 
security advisors results report that only 56% of the respondents were satisfied with the 
timeliness of intelligence products and only 50% were satisfied with the “actionability” 
of such intelligence (p. 6). The fusion process is the stage in the intelligence cycle where 
raw intelligence and information is turned into actionable knowledge (DOJ, 2006, p. 2). 
These low statistics seem to verify the complexity of producing quality analysis at the 
federal level for use by state and local homeland security agencies. However, it may also 
reflect unrealistic expectations and unfamiliarity with the current capabilities of the 




In a speech by the Director of the Intelligence Staff on November 1, 2008, 
Burgess (2008) describes the mission of the intelligence community as being to develop a 
decision advantage over our adversaries in the face of the increasingly complex global 
situation, which continuously creates new threats.  
We live in a dynamic world in which the pace, scope, and complexity of 
change are increasing. Increased global connectivity, interdependence and 
complexity create a less predictable future. Globalization—while it has 
certainly opened up avenues for growth and prosperity around the world—
has also complicated persistent threats and has generated emerging 
missions, such as cyber, energy, and infectious disease. In addition, 
changing demographics, population stresses, and resource scarcities have 
the potential to create economic and political instability worldwide… Our 
mission in the U.S. Intelligence Community is to create decision 
advantage through a globally-networked and integrated intelligence 
enterprise. (p. 2) 
Burgess addresses key initiatives in Vision 2015 as being methods to develop 
such a decision advantage: customer-driven intelligence model, mission-focused 
operations, net-centric information enterprise, and an integrated enterprise in order to 
foster collaboration. Successful implementation will be critical to accomplishing that 
goal. Until then, the ability to provide actionable intelligence to state and local 
jurisdictions will remain a challenge. 
The next part of this discussion will focus on the analysis phase, which is the 
mainstay of the intelligence process (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 109).  The analysis phase 
consists of two parts, the analysis component and the product development component. 
This discussion will focus on the analysis component. The critical aspect of the analysis 
component is the fusion of the various elements of raw intelligence or information. The 
complexity involved in the fusion process is that combining the data elements is only part 
of the development of a good analytic product. “Successful intelligence analysis is a 
holistic process involving both “art” and “science” (Moore and Krizan, 2003, p. 101). 
Because of the artistry involved, analysis is the part of the intelligence process that is the 
most difficult to model or document.  
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The Fusion Center Guidelines define fusion as a supportive process for 
“implementation of risk-based, information-driven prevention, response and consequence 
management programs” (DOJ, 2006, p. 11). These guidelines describe the fusion process 
a method for sharing distributive information from the federal, state, and local levels via a 
common interface. Figure 5 depicts the fusion process as described above. This figure 
incorporates the concept that end users can use intelligence products either in a 
prevention capability when the product is disseminated proactively or in a response 
capability when the product is disseminated in a reactive or support mode. 
 
Figure 5.   Fusion Process – Fusion Center Guidelines. (From: DOJ, 2006, p. 11). 
The guidelines also provide a list of 10 critical elements that must be addressed in 
order to ensure an effective fusion process, the importance of which has also been noted. 
a. Use of Common Terminology 
Because of multidisciplinary participation in the analysis process, the 
potential for misinterpretation of information exists due to the use of the same or similar 
terms to denote very different concepts. An example is the word casualty. In the public  
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health field, a casualty is an individual who has become ill or injured somehow during an 
incident. However, in other professions, the term casualty is used when referring to an 
individual who is deceased. 
b. Current Awareness of the Global Threat 
In the public health arena, awareness of the global emergence of new 
zoonotic and other infectious diseases is critical to understanding the potential health 
threat to the United States because of the ease of global travel and the migratory nature of 
disease in both animals and humans. 
c. Understanding the Linkages between Terrorism and Non-
Terrorism Related Information 
Again, the health and medical sector plays a significant role in this 
element. Not all health and medical issues are terrorism related, but almost all terrorism 
issues have health and medical implications due to the potential for injuries and fatalities. 
Health and medical information may also play a significant role in responding to terrorist 
incidents, such as the recognition of a patient’s symptoms as being indicative of exposure 
to a biological agent. 
d. Clearly Defined Intelligence Requirements 
The definition of intelligence requirements is a challenge for even well 
seasoned consumers of intelligence. This process must be evolutionary relative to 
changes in the environment, because as emerging infectious diseases mutate and spread 
globally, information requirements should reflect those changes. In addition, in order for 
consumers to establish requirements, they must first understand the changing nature of 
the potential threat. This requires a meaningful interchange between the analyst and the 
consumer. 
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e. Delineation of Roles and Responsibilities of Each Agency 
Because of the very nature of fusion, it requires interaction and 
collaboration between a variety of agencies within different disciplines and from different 
levels of government. It is imperative that the governance structure address the roles and 
responsibilities of each agency so that no gaps exist in the review of raw intelligence, and 
so that each agency understands the limitations of information access and sharing as 
defined by law. 
f. Elimination of Impediments to Information Sharing 
The establishment of a collaborative environment is one of the greatest 
hurdles for members of the intelligence community. At the national level, the intelligence 
community has developed A-Space, an abbreviation for “Analyst-Space,” as a 
collaborative environment. Time Magazine ranked A-Space among the Year’s Best 50 
Inventions for 2008. This restricted collaborative environment allows analysts across 
agency boundaries to discuss ideas about the latest developments in the intelligence arena 
(Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 2008). Within the health and 
medical community, however, the willingness to share information across agency 
domains still requires improvement. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has 
an initiative called BioPHusion (Rolka, O’Connor, and Walker, In Press, p. 6), which will 
integrate many disparate, biologically related data sources. Simultaneously, the 
Department of Homeland Security is developing its own initiative, known as the National 
Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) (Eric Myers, Director, National 
Biosurveillance Integration Center, personal communication, October 15, 2008 at the 
Health Security Intelligence (HIS) Workshop). Both of these elements intend to have a 
reporting component to public health practitioners, but the BioPHusion initiative 
currently produces reports only for “the CDC Director, program leadership and selected 
external partners” (Rolka et al., p. 6). The NBIC is in its infancy at this point and is not 
yet developing reports for external partners (Eric Myers, Director, National 
Biosurveillance Integration Center, personal communication, October 15, 2008 at the 
Health Security Intelligence (HIS) Workshop). 
 27
Several issues affect the ability to share information, including the need by 
law enforcement to hold close information related to ongoing investigations, the degree 
of trust that each discipline has with other participating agencies, and the ability for 
information technology systems to communicate between each other so that information 
can be shared electronically. Because of years of secrecy about intelligence operations, a 
new breed of analyst must be developed that encourages information sharing to build a 
more comprehensive picture of threats in the environment. 
g. Interaction with the Private Sector and the Public 
Because 85% of our nation’s critical infrastructure lies within the private 
sector, it is imperative that fusion centers and the analysis process include that portion of 
the private sector at a minimum (Government Accounting Office, 2006, p. 1).  One of the 
most successful endeavors in collaboration between the public and private sectors for the 
purpose of intelligence fusion is that of the New York City Police Department through its 
product, known as NYPD SHIELD. The private sector values these reports because they 
provide timely reports that are accurate, brief, and fact-based (Crosbie, 2008, p. 60).  
h. Connectivity with Intelligence and Information Repositories 
As mentioned previously under eliminating impediments to information 
sharing, the ability for analysts to access a variety of information sources is critical for 
the development of a true and comprehensive understanding of the threat picture. A-
Space, BioPHusion, and NBIC all attempt to address this requirement. The greatest 
limitation to both BioPHusion and NBIC is that their focus is strictly on biological 
threats. They do not attempt to integrate chemical and radiological information sources, 
which can also tremendously impact public health (Rolka et al., p. 6); Eric Myers, 
Director, National Biosurveillance Integration Center, personal communication, October 
15, 2008 at the Health Security Intelligence (HIS) Workshop). 
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i. Participation of Subject-Matter Experts in the Analytic Process 
As mentioned in the Stimson report, the complexity and changing nature 
of analysis and fusion requires that technical capabilities be dispersed across varying 
disciplines, and that the analysis processes must be geared toward different professional 
expectations. Because of this, subject matter experts are critical to conducting technically 
proficient analyses. Many simple solutions exist for incorporating subject matter 
expertise into the fusion process, including the use of collaborative software, such as 
Microsoft Groove, Google Applications Sites, and WebEOC. These products will be 
discussed further in the chapter on knowledge management. 
j. Oversight and Accountability to Protect Civil Liberties 
Because of the personal nature of a portion of the information collected, 
the public deserves the right to have that information protected and maintained in 
accordance with all federal, state, and local laws. This concern is particularly applicable 
to the health and medical field in the daily collection of health data for syndromic 
surveillance. Because this information is de-identified at the source, the requirements of 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) are met; however, 
other identity data elements may be collected upon initiation of an investigation into a 
disease outbreak, and this information must be protected from disclosure.2 
These critical elements of the fusion process will be discussed further in 
the evaluation of the health threat assessment model. 
B. JOHN BOYD’S OODA LOOP 
1. Decision Making 
Colonel John Boyd revolutionized the thought process for United States Air Force 
pilots when he realized that faster aircraft did not win battles; instead, it was the primacy 
of the pilots’ ability to make quick decisions. Using the same basic concept of developing 
                                                 
2 The titles of these subparagraphs are summaries of the listing of the issues that must be addressed in 
order to have an effective fusion process as provided in the Fusion Center Guidelines, pp. 11-12. 
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a decision advantage in combat, he developed a model called the OODA Loop, which 
stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. The approach is based on the simple 
principle that getting inside the enemy’s decision cycle gives you greater advantage than 
being able to fly or move faster (Curts and Campbell, 2001, p. 4-5). His model, shown in 
Figure 6, demonstrates the four-phase process of rapid decision making.  
This model is easily compared to the stages of the intelligence cycle. In the first 
stage, the decision maker is presented with multiple inputs, including the sensory events 
of the unfolding incident and other information, such as input from nearby team 
members. Upon gathering this information, which is similar to the collection stage of the 
intelligence cycle, the decision maker processes it against the guidance and control 
functions implicit in the requirements or planning stage of the intelligence cycle. This 
information is then pushed forward into the orientation stage in the OODA Loop. In 
comparing this stage to the intelligence cycle, the orient stage is similar to the analysis 
stage. Boyd provides greater clarity regarding the various factors that influence the 
analysis process. He postulates that the individual’s cultural traditions, their genetic 
heritage, and their previous experience interact with new information as it enters the 
decision cycle during the analysis and synthesis process. While it may seem taboo to 
include cultural traditions and genetic heritage into the process of decision making, we 
have seen that radical elements of the Islamic culture use their culture as means to 
develop a terrorism threat. I would also suggest that cultural traditions could also 
represent the differing disciplines now involved in the intelligence development process. 
Once the information has been processed and the decision maker has determined 
the implications of the information, the recommendations are fed forward for decision. 
The decision process is similar to the production stage of the intelligence cycle. Once the 
decision is made, its dissemination occurs in the process of feeding that decision forward 
for action, as is the case in the intelligence cycle. Both models contain the feedback loop, 
which returns information to the assessment of the situation; however, as in the 
Lowenthal intelligence cycle model, feedback in the OODA Loop enters the decision 
making process along a continuum rather than being restricted to the beginning of the 
cyclic process. 
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The importance of the OODA Loop is that it compares with the intelligence cycle, 
but it compacts the time into much smaller segments and provides greater clarity 
regarding the influences on the analyst during the analysis process.  
 
Figure 6.   John Boyd’s OODA Loop Model. (From: Boyd, August 1987) 
C. COGNITIVE HIERARCHY – QUALIA 
1. Cognitive Hierarchy 
The purpose for the discussion of Boyd’s OODA Loop is to demonstrate the 
varying levels of cognitive hierarchy as one moves through the decision making process. 
When data points are first encountered, they are discrete, unrelated elements, and they 
provide us with very little reason to make a decision. As the data points are gathered 
together, they begin to display some relationship to each other, thus becoming 
information. The relationship may be categories, such as the number of patients seen with 
gastrointestinal illness or an usual number of patients with influenza-like symptoms. At 
this point, we acquire situational awareness, but not necessarily knowledge. In order to 
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gain knowledge, the information must be analyzed for patterns, trends, and other types of 
similarities. As knowledge, the cognitive process is incomplete because the actionable 
element has yet to be formed. This actionable element represents the “so what” factor of 
the information. What does this information mean to me relative to the situation with 
which I am involved? This stage of the process involves the cognitive interaction of the 
individual’s training, experience, genetic heritage (according to Boyd), culture, and 
possibly the insertion of new information. The result of this processing is an 
understanding of the data. The new understanding is often described as the “aha!” 
moment.3 
The concept of the cognitive hierarchy, where knowledge is different from 
understanding, helps to explain the concept that successful intelligence analysis results 
from more than the fusion of a collection of multiple data sources. Fusion must provide 
insights that were not previously known from the individual data elements. 
Lowenthal (2006) draws the analogy between intelligence analysis and the 
assembly of a mosaic. Many pieces are in front of the artist and must be assembled, yet 
not all the pieces may be present. Some may appear while the mosaic is being assembled, 
others may get broken so they are no longer the same shape, while still others may 
become unusable (p. 127). Because of the changing nature of the pieces of the mosaic, 
the resulting picture is different from the artist’s original intent for the design. 
Extending the analogy of analysis being an artistic expression, fusion as the basis 
for the analysis represents the component that enables the assembly of the pieces of 
information to create a picture or insight that is not otherwise apparent when viewing the 
individual data points. As new pieces of information are added to the knowledge base, 
new connections are seen between the new and the old information, thus forming 
patterns. These patterns establish new insights creating “aha!” moments to form ideas  
 
 
                                                 
3 This cognitive hierarchy was developed from a discussion by Curts and Campbell (2001). I did not 
agree with all seven levels of the cognitive hierarchy as presented in their discussion, however, and only 
included the levels that I felt were applicable to this discussion. For further information, see Raymond J. 
Curts and Douglas E. Campbell, (2001). 
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that have an impact that is greater than the sum of the data points (Garst and Gross, 2003, 
p. 105). This moment of comprehending something greater than the analyst had before is 
the point of reaching true understanding—the qualia, as termed by philosophers.  
2. Qualia 
Qualia—or quale in its singular form—are described as the “introspectively 
accessible properties of experiences that characterize what it is like to have them” (Tye, 
2002, p. 447).  More simply, qualia are the phenomenon of experiencing the “what it is 
like” to have a particular sensation. These sensations can include perceptual experiences, 
such as seeing a color, hearing a noise, smelling a scent, or touching a texture. Qualia can 
also refer to bodily sensations, such as feeling faint or pain. The experiences of emotions 
represent another category considered by philosophers to be qualia, such as love, 
jealousy, fear, etc. In addition, moods such as depression, boredom, and tension, can also 
be considered qualia (Tye, 2008). 
Jackson (1982) presents the classic discussion of visual qualia. In his example, 
Mary is a brilliant scientist who knows all there is to know about color. Her training is in 
neurophysiology, so she knows the physical reaction of the retina when light spectrums 
enter the eye. Her training includes an understanding of the vocal chords when speaking 
the words, “red” and “blue.” It can be argued that she knows everything there is to know 
about the physical aspects of color, but she has never seen the color red before. Her life 
has been restricted to a black and white room, and she can only view the world through a 
black and white television. The first time she steps outside her room and actually sees 
red, she experiences something and gains an understanding of the color red that she never 
had before. Mary acquires a new and phenomenal concept of the color red. That 
experience is known as qualia (p. 130). 
Many philosophers agree that an individual can experience qualia through sight, 
smell, taste, touch, or sound. However, Strawson (1994) argues that an individual can 
also “experience” thought. His argument is that the experience of thought results from a 
complex modification of the quality of one’s course of experience that results in the 
“understanding experience” (pp. 5-10). Therefore, an individual can experience thought 
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qualia when he or she acquires an understanding of a concept. More importantly, the 
environment of the situation at the time of the experience influences the experience of 
understanding a particular concept. Horgan and Tienson (2002) use the phrase 
phenomenal intentionality to describe the influences made by the environment on the 
effect of experience (p. 524).  
The importance of qualia and phenomenal intentionality to the intelligence cycle 
is critical to understanding the complexity involved with developing intelligence. When 
applied to the intelligence cycle and the OODA Loop, qualia can be applied to the 
concept of the new “understanding” gained during the analysis or orienting process. In 
this portion of the process, as Boyd and Horgan point out, environmental factors can 
influence the analysis process. The development of a process for continuous input from 
the environment will result in an improved intelligence product. The question then 
becomes how we can develop the process for continuous input from the environment to 
influence the analysis portion of the intelligence cycle in a positive manner. 
3. Health Intelligence Qualia 
A scenario that exemplifies the development of health intelligence qualia could be 
similar to the following: 
• A public health analyst sends a report to a public health emergency 
preparedness official about the theft of several ambulances over the past 
several weeks in the Midwest portion of the United States. 
• The public health emergency preparedness official forwards the report to a 
local Emergency Medical Services (EMS) agency. EMS personnel read 
the report and comment that they see the implications to the local area 
relative to hospitals being soft targets regardless of location, so this could 
be an area of concern. 
• The public health emergency preparedness official replies that not only are 
hospitals soft targets, but also wonders how many hospitals have the 
ability to establish alternate emergency room capabilities quickly. In 
addition, notes that because the city is home to many of the region’s level 
one trauma centers, it is likely that no one would consider an ambulance 
with license plates from a Midwestern state as being uncommon. This 
obscurity could result from the large number of ambulances that travel the 
city daily transporting patients from outlying area hospitals to the trauma 
centers.  
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• This exchange of thoughts resulted in a deeper level of understanding 
(qualia) for both fire and emergency medical services as well as public 
health emergency preparedness personnel. 
• Emergency medical services personnel acknowledge that they will 
disseminate the information to heighten situational awareness of the 
potential threat. 
• The public health emergency preparedness official instructs the public 
health intelligence analyst to add this story to the daily fusion center report 
with the implications as noted above so as to inform local law enforcement 
personnel to be more aware of ambulances with license plates from 
external jurisdictions or those with unfamiliar markings. In addition, she 
also contacts hospitals to ascertain the ability of each to establish alternate 
emergency room capabilities and discovers that only a few have even the 
slightest ability to accomplish the task based on current plans. All agree to 
look into options and report during the next monthly hospital emergency 
preparedness meeting. 
• The completion of this cycle results in an improved understanding of the 
threat posed to the jurisdiction within multiple first responder categories 
and allows for implementation of preventive actions and mitigation plans 
based upon the implications derived through the collaborative discussion. 
D. COLLABORATION IMPERATIVE 
The scenario described above demonstrates the new understanding that can 
develop through effective collaboration. As discussed previously, the criteria for 
development of an effective fusion process found in the Fusion Center Guidelines 
provides a starting point for examining this concept. A review of those criteria reveals 
that improving the fusion process implies the construction of an information sharing 
environment that focuses on collaboration between multiple agencies and experts rather 
than relying on interpretation of the information by a single analyst. The collaborative 
environmental factors include development of common terminology, which requires an 
understanding of the global threat and linkages between terrorism and non-terrorism 
information through the sharing of information between the national and global 
communities with state and local health officials. Defining intelligence requirements 
requires not only a deliberate decision process to focus the analysts’ efforts, but it also 
demands feedback to analysts regarding the utility of their products as well as 
recommendations for additional areas that require intelligence development based on 
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changes in the operating environment. The criteria that require the most collaboration 
from external environmental partners are elimination of impediments to information 
sharing, interaction with the private sector, participation by subject matter experts, and 
connectivity with a variety of intelligence streams. These four aspects of intelligence 
development not only illustrate the need for aggregation of the information streams but 
also for the need for collaboration between analysts of different agencies and with other 
external experts.  
The literature documents the essential nature of collaboration in relation to 
intelligence development. McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence said in his 
Vision 2015 document: 
To transform the [Intelligence] Community and create decision advantage, 
we will need to accomplish the following … Remove barriers to cross 
agency collaboration by integrating the strategic enablers of the 
Intelligence Enterprise – human capital, education and training, business 
systems, facilities, science and technology, and acquisition and 
procurement (Introductory Letter) 
In a paper published through the Center for Study of Intelligence, Cooper (2005) 
states:  
The success of the Intelligence Community depends on the promotion of 
an entire set of effective collaborations: among analysts; between analysts 
and collectors; between analysts and operations officers; between analysts 
and the intelligence users; and not least, between community analysts and 
information sources outside the intelligence or national security enterprise 
(p. 56).  
Collaboration remains a critical element of the intelligence development process, 
because the need to overcome threats has not diminished since the days of the Cold War; 
only the nature of the threat has changed (Garst and Gross, 2003, p. 108). The mandate 
for collaboration within the intelligence community has increased now because of the 
complexity and technical nature of the information that analysts are expected to review. 
Subtle nuances in highly technical fields, such as public health and medicine, may only 
be understood by specific disciplines. Therefore, specific communities of interest will be 
required to advise on highly technical matters. 
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has demonstrated that numerous models describe the intelligence 
development process, and that a number of individuals have built upon the original model 
developed by the Central Intelligence Agency. These models have a great deal in 
common with John Boyd’s decision-making OODA Loop. The common element in all of 
the models is the documentation of the complexity of the analysis process. The basis of 
the analysis process must be collaboration in order to build the most useful and 
comprehensive intelligence product. The next chapter will discuss a model for use at the 
state and local levels for building a specific intelligence product, a health threat 
assessment. 
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IV. HEALTH THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Producing machines capable of artificial thought was easy. Producing a 
machine capable of intelligence has proven elusive because there just isn't 
anything on which to model it. 
— Judge Crater 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter demonstrated the requirement for collaboration in order to 
produce intelligence qualia. This chapter will present a model for the development of a 
health threat assessment for use at the state and local levels. This model incorporates the 
concepts presented in the various intelligence cycle models as well as Boyd’s OODA 
Loop model. 
B. FUSION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, analysis is the mainstay of the intelligence 
cycle. The imperative for good analysis is fusion of both the aggregated information 
sources and the thoughts of analysts, subject matter experts, and operational field 
personnel. McConnell in his Vision 2015 states:   
By 2015, a globally networked Intelligence Enterprise will be essential to 
meet the demands for greater forethought and improved strategic agility. 
The existing agency-centric Intelligence Community must evolve into a 
true Intelligence Enterprise established on a collaborative foundation of 
shared services, mission-centric operations, and integrated mission 
management, all enabled by a smooth flow of people, ideas, and activities 
across the boundaries of the Intelligence Community agency members. (p. 
5) 
Because of the importance of information sharing and fusion to the intelligence 
cycle, this discussion will begin with the focal point of the health threat assessment 
model, fusion qualia, which is presented in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.   Fusion – Qualia.  
This portion of the model, graphically designed by Neil Troppman under direction 
of the author, demonstrates the aggregation of data or information elements and the 
fusion of that information as it is reviewed through the analysis process. The multiple 
colors used on the lines as information enters the process depict different categories of 
information. This information is either health and medical related information or generic 
threat information developed by other portions of the analysis process. Examples of the 
various types of information are syndromic surveillance information, BioWatch daily 
sampling results, wholesale food distributor inspections, and local threat intelligence. The 
changing color of the lines after an intersection with another line depicts the addition of 
some kind of knowledge by combining two pieces of information.  It also depicts the 
exchange of ideas between analysts, thus resulting in increased knowledge. As these lines 
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continue to intersect various pieces of information with different analysts, a greater 
understanding of the situation may develop. These points of increased understanding are 
the intersections noted by the red dots. The red dots represent qualia, the thought process 
in which this understanding occurs. Qualia are the essential elements of our intelligence 
development process that must develop in order for the process to be truly effective. 
The form of the model is also significant. Reflecting on the funnel of causality 
referenced in Chapter III, this portion of the model was designed in the shape of a funnel 
in order to represent the time dimension characteristics of the funnel of causality. Imagine 
that the central axis represents time and the intersecting lines represent collaborating 
thoughts and new information passing through time (Campbell et al., 1980, p. 24). As the 
information is analyzed and lines intersect, some information is culled, new information 
is formed, and the individual experiences qualia. With each piece of new information is 
added to the funnel, a better understanding of the threat occurs, and this process continues 
with some information culled out. This is depicted by the smaller ending of the funnel. 
Despite the smaller amount of information present, a greater amount of understanding, or 
qualia, has occurred. 
C. HEALTH THREAT ASSESSMENT MODEL 
The basis of the model development was derived from the previous models 
already discussed; the Intelligence Development Cycle using concepts employed in the 
versions from the CIA Factbook, the Fusion Center Guidelines, and Lowenthal’s 
multilayered process, in conjunction with those in the Funnel of Causality and Boyd’s 
OODA Loop. This model was graphically designed by Neil Troppman under direction of 
the author. 
1. Planning and Direction 
The planning and direction portion of the process is an iterative function by 
leadership that provides priority information requirements for intelligence collection and 
product development and dissemination guidelines. Although often depicted at the top of  
 
 40
the intelligence cycle, planning and direction can occur at any stage throughout the 
process. This is shown by aligning it along the entire left side of the health threat 
assessment model. 
2. Collection/Observe 
In order to develop the health threat assessment model, the data input selection 
must be reviewed. Natarajan presented a listing of 25 categories of information that could 
be collected at the state and local levels for aggregation and analysis. In addition to the 
listing he presented, I have added other categories that are also available, in Table 2. I 
have color coded black those presented by Natarajan, while the measures that I have 
added are color coded in blue. These additional information sources were developed 
based upon my experience as a Director of Public Health Preparedness for the District of 
Columbia and were validated or expanded during my survey and interview process. 
These categories are further classified into information that may be available at the state 
or local levels and information that is available from the federal government. 
 
Local Federal 
Animal Control  
Radioactive Material Movement/Theft  
Nuclear Plant Operations  
Reportable Disease Surveillance CDC National Electronic Disease 
Surveillance System (NEDSS) 
Syndromic Surveillance BioPHusion4 / BioSense  
School Health Disease Surveillance Epidemic Information Exchange (EPI-X) 
Independent Practitioner  
Over-The-Counter Drug Sales  
Pre-hospital Care Diagnosis CDC Quarantine Stations 
Poison Control National Poisoning Data System 
                                                 
4 BioPHusion is a combination of 42 different biological related information sources including 
BioSense, Epi-X, Global Disease Detection-Outbreak Disease Detection Reports, Division of Global 
Migration and Quarantine Daily Reports, CDC Biosurveillance Coordination Unit, Department of 
Homeland Security National Biological Information System Reports. 
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Local Federal 
Long Term Care facilities  
Regional Health Information Systems  
Coroner & Medical Examiner  
Occupational Health  
Laboratory Information System Laboratory Response Network 
Animal Disease Surveillance  
State Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Inspection Service,  
U.S. Department of Agriculture 
Carcass Removal  
Behavioral Health  
Food Inspection Retail & Wholesale  
BioWatch Federal Government Biological Sensors 




Environmental Protection Agency 
Water Quality Testing  
Air Sampling  
Table 2.   Data sets for inclusion in the development of a health threat assessment. 
(After: Natarajan, 2007) 
From the sheer volume of the data presented in Table 2, the complexity of the 
problem of data aggregation and fusion is obvious. The challenge lies not only in 
accessing the data but also in gathering sufficient technical expertise to provide 
interpretation in order for the development of qualia. 
Some of these information sources undergo analysis prior to entering the larger 
fusion process. In many states, epidemiologists electronically collect syndromic 
surveillance data and analyze the information with automated algorithms. Because this 
data is not a direct input to the fusion process, the process has been depicted as a separate 
fusion process and then is input into the larger fusion process in the diagram. The data 
that may be included in a jurisdiction’s syndromic surveillance are hospital emergency 
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room admission diagnoses, school nurse disease diagnoses, poison control call data, over-
the-counter drug purchases, pre-hospital care diagnoses, and regional health information 
system disease diagnoses from community health centers. In addition, these data points 
are depicted in separate layers in the diagram to note that some information sources are 
available at state and local levels and others are strictly available through the Federal 
government.  
3. Processing 
This stage prepares raw intelligence data into something that is useable by 
intelligence analysts. The automated algorithmic processes used to analyze syndromic 
surveillance data can be viewed as a processing step because the individual data points of 
each hospital emergency room visit, school nurse illness reporting, etc, would be 
meaningless unless the instances are compared to trends locally, regionally, and 
seasonally. 
4. Analysis and Production/Orient 
The analysis and production portion of the diagram align with Boyd’s Orient 
phase of the OODA Loop. As discussed in the previous chapter, this stage of the 
intelligence cycle process is the mainstay of the process, and with effective information 
and thought sharing, qualia can result, thus allowing for the production of a more useful 
health threat assessment.  
5. Decide 
The entire intelligence cycle exists to provide actionable information so that 
decision makers can formulate policies and action. When an analyst attains the level of 
understanding regarding a particular threat, the decision maker must decide the 
immediacy of the desired action. Three possible products are: 
• Health Threat Alert - urgent information that indicates system action may 
become necessary at any time. An example might be a suspected norovirus 
outbreak at a hotel that causes large numbers of visitors to seek health care 
at a number of local emergency rooms. 
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• Health Threat Advisory - urgent information but no activation is warranted 
or expected at this time (i.e., two feet of snow with icy conditions 
expected tonight. This could lead to a number of accidents resulting in a 
large increase in casualties being evacuated to hospital emergency rooms). 
This information is for situational awareness only.  
• Health Threat Update - non-urgent information, but sufficiently important 
to update information that has already been disseminated. An example of 
this would be confirmation by the public health laboratory that the 
foodborne illness was determined to be norovirus.5 
6. Act / Disseminate 
The final stage of the health threat assessment process is dissemination of the 
intelligence with guidance on actions to take. The dissemination process can occur 
through a multitude of technologies, including the Health Alert Network (HAN), email, 
WebEOC, or other information sharing technologies. 
The actions recommended may be specific personal protective measures, such as 
reminders to use universal precautions, pharmaceutical prophylaxis, and treatment 
protocols, advisories to review decontamination and treatment for specific chemical 
agents, and requests for acquisition of specific specimen types; i.e., blood, fecal, or 
vomitus. 
7. Feedback 
It is extremely important that analysts and information sources receive feedback 
on the usefulness of the products and the information provided by the various sources. 
This is imperative for the process to improve continually and thus produce products that 
meet the needs of the consumers and stakeholders. In Vision 2015, McConnell states: 
Old problems assume new dimensions: information operations with 
emphasis on a cyber domain, asymmetric political or military responses, 
and illicit trafficking. Lastly, we confront the challenge of acting in an 
environment that is more time-sensitive and open to the flow of 
information, in which intelligence sources and analysis compete in a  
 
                                                 
5 These alert levels are consistent with those established by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention per their “Guidance for Developing Public Health Alerts, Advisories, or Updates.”  
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public context established by a global media. By 2015 we will need 
integrated and collaborative capabilities that can anticipate and rapidly 
respond to a wide array of threats and risks. (p. 5) 
,This model of a health threat assessment presents documentation of a process for 
addressing the problem of disconnected information sources across a state or local 
jurisdiction in conjunction with information sources within the Federal government. The 
model demonstrates the ability to integrate and collaborate in order to build a health 
threat assessment through fusion qualia to respond to a wide array of health and medical 
threats. 
Figure 8 depicts the health threat assessment process and its relationships with the 
traditional Intelligence Cycle and Boyd’s OODA Loop. 
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Figure 8.   Health Threat Assessment model. 
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D. MODEL DEVELOPMENT THEMES 
During the interview process, despite the variety of individuals interviewed, 
several reoccurring themes arose that deserve mention.  These topic areas were 
incorporated into the design of the model where possible. Appendix E documents the 
analysis of these themes by individual interviewed. 
1. Layers 
One concern was that the data and information input occurs in a number of layers 
because of the varying nature of the data involved. Some information is automated, while 
others must be culled. The automated information will likely be received with a steady 
frequency and standardized data elements. This information is shown as such at the top 
layer of fusion, called disease surveillance. Because of the routine nature of this data, 
exceptional data elements are more easily identified than data that is not routinely 
collected. 
In addition, multiple layers of information exist because of the multiple layers of 
government. The model depicts state and local information separately from that of the 
federal government. This is appropriate because the scope of information available at the 
federal level is nationally focused and may assist in developing an understanding of the 
threats that are external to a particular jurisdiction, but that may affect the jurisdiction in 
some future period. 
2. Thresholds 
Several individuals also commented on the establishment of thresholds and the 
difficulty in doing so. Since this is a relatively new field, the ability to draw on historic 
data at the state and local levels may be difficult, particularly in areas where data has 
never been automated. Although all believed that there should be more than one type of 
emphasis given to finished intelligence, some thought that the ability to distinguish 
between what would fall into the category of alert over an advisory would most often be 
subjective. This issue is not incorporated in the model and is a field for future research. 
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3. Collaboration 
All agreed that collaboration was critical to the process. Several raised the issue of 
connectivity to perform the collaboration, the policies that need to be developed in order 
to share the information, and the degrees of willingness to share information across 
cultures. Information sharing with law enforcement is easy to do, but law enforcement 
sharing information with public health was not viewed as readily apparent. The 
requirement for development of social networks and trust must be satisfied not only at the 
analyst level, but also at the health commissioner/police chief/fire chief level or policies 
will not be implemented to foster collaboration. The concept of collaboration has already 
been discussed extensively relative to how it has been included in the fusion/qualia 
portion of the model. 
4. Decision Making 
Because of the number of individuals ideally involved in the collaboration 
process, some concern about the identity of the final decision maker arose in multiple 
interviews. Within the health and medical community, there must be a number of experts 
involved in the collaboration process because of the highly technical aspects of many 
categories of information. The question then arises, should the decision maker be an 
analyst, one of the subject matter experts, or a person outside the process who can 
consider the intelligence developed from a more objective viewpoint. Based on 
information obtained through interviews, the decision maker is included in the model as a 
separate and discrete element following the fusion process. This takes into consideration 
the need for separation between fusion, which recommends actions, and decision making, 
which directs actions. 
5. Products 
Almost all individuals interviewed discussed the issue of products. The format, 
frequency, and customers were the top concerns raised. In considering format, the options 
range from hard copy text documents, to text email, to graphic presentations, to web  
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pages, and while all are options to consider, the decision is based on customer preference. 
The need for separate products for different groups of stakeholders is presented in the 
model; however, the format and content of the product is a field for future research. 
6. Technology 
The availability of technology to conduct the collaboration and the presentation of 
products represented two additional concerns. Although somewhat related, the analytic 
process portion of the technology was seen by several as the more difficult of the two. 
This issue was cited as a task almost too difficult to overcome in rural areas where 
funding is extremely limited and current levels of automation for data gathering are 
almost non-existent. The technology available for collaboration and analysis is a topic for 
future research and is not represented in the model itself. 
7. “Real-time” Issue 
The last issue to be mentioned is the timeliness of the information. Most disease 
surveillance only pulls data and analyzes it on 24-hour cycles at the most frequent basis, 
so emergency care providers may be the only individuals able to notice immediately that 
an incident is occurring. By definition, aggregation of data infers that some time has 
passed. Indeed, if the fusion process is done well, it will involve more than one analyst or 
subject matter expert, which decreases the ability to provide “real-time” value from the 
information. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a model for the development of a health threat assessment 
at the state and local level, which was formulated by gathering information through 
surveys and interviews. The model was then compared to the intelligence cycle and the 
OODA Loop. The health threat assessment process could occur in fusion centers or 
through collaborative information sharing technologies with individuals at disparate 
locations.  
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V. STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING AN INFORMATION 
SHARING CULTURE 
Any change, even a change for the better, is always accompanied by 
drawbacks and discomforts.  
— Enoch Arnold Bennett 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of developing health threat qualia is new to the intelligence world. 
The terminology itself is nascent in the published literature.6 The previous chapters have 
focused on the model for developing a health threat assessment. This chapter will focus 
on the strategy for implementation of the model.  
B. BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY 
Whether developing strategy for military, business, or government, “strategy will 
always involve both opportunity and risk” (Kim and Mauborgne, 2005, p. 19). The 
opportunity presented by this strategy is the development of a culture that is rich in 
information sharing and may ultimately result in health threat qualia. In the intelligence 
world, however, risk also relates to the necessary balance between information sharing 
and the compromise of sensitive information.  
The first requirement is the need to balance the risk of restricting information 
distribution due to concerns about the compromise of sensitive information by law 
enforcement and the consequent inability of the rest of the first responder community to 
take prevention or preparedness actions because of an absence of information concerning 
a specific threat. The failure to develop new ways to share information in an effort to 
understand the nuances of specialty areas, including the health threat, could result in 
unnecessary disease and injury. In view of the level of sophistication of our current 
                                                 
6 Other than this paper, Rolka’s prepublication work is the only other discussion found regarding this 
area of intelligence and his work focuses on the development of this concept at the federal level.  
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ability to develop a robust base of knowledge, however, such an outcome is unacceptable. 
Since 2001, the intelligence community has been developing technologies that are 
increasingly collaborative. Still, products and processes devoted specifically to the 
development of health threat assessments should become the next focus for inclusion in 
this process. 
This next discussion will include the development of an implementation strategy 
for building a health threat assessment by developing untapped market space, termed the 
Blue Ocean Strategy by Kim and Mauborgne (2005). The focus of their argument is that 
a blue ocean differs from a red ocean in that red oceans represent current market space or 
organizational processes. Conversely, blue oceans represent the markets or organizational 
processes that not currently existent in industry (p. 5). The cornerstone of a blue ocean 
strategy is the implementation of a new market space based on value innovation, which 
focuses on the creation of high value through innovation or differentiation, while 
reducing cost (p. 13). The development of a blue ocean strategy canvas includes 
consideration of four factors. These factors answer the questions, “What should be 
eliminated, reduced, raised, and created?”  The first two factors eliminate “cost” to the 
organization while the second two improve “value” (pp. 29-30). The next part of this 
discussion will focus on addressing these questions as they relate to the development of a 
health threat assessment. 
1. What Should be Eliminated? 
Information silos in the intelligence community must be eliminated both between 
law enforcement and non-traditional intelligence community members as well as between 
those agencies internal to non-traditional intelligence communities, such as among 
various specialties in public health. 
Currently, information sharing is often restricted based on security and handling 
classifications, such as “law enforcement sensitive,” thus producing or sustaining 




Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security (2008), titled Domestic Terrorist 
CBRN Intent and Capabilities Threat Assessment.  The front page of the document 
contains the handling instructions:  
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE: This information is the property of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and may be distributed to state, 
tribal, or local government law enforcement officials with a need-to-know. 
Further distribution without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions 
should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a 
manner that precludes unauthorized access. (p. 1) 
When contacted for permission to distribute the document to state and local 
agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation denied distribution to health departments 
and local health care facilities.7 This document clearly has public health implications, but 
sharing the information with public health officials and hospitals, both of which represent 
communities that play significant roles in the management and treatment of casualties 
from weapons of mass destruction, is prohibited.  According to 20 CFR Part 23, as stated 
in 1993 Revision and Commentary, the penalty for distribution of these reports without 
permission is a fine up to $10,000, in addition to any other penalty imposed by law.8  
In order for non-traditional intelligence community partners, such as health 
departments, to protect their communities and respond appropriately in the event of an 
incident, the intelligence community must eliminate this type of restriction in information 
sharing. According to Natarajan, proposed legislation is pending that would require 
release of information in an unclassified manner before release of the classified version 
(Nitin Natarajan, Program Manager, Critical Infrastructure Program, Department of 
Health and Human Services, personal communication, October 1, 2008, Seattle, WA, at 
the Director’s of Public Health Preparedness Conference); however, the document 
                                                 
7 This permission was denied by Federal Bureau of Investigation General Council per Unit Chief FBI 
Domestic Terrorism Analysis Unit per email dated November 15, 2008 with Washington Regional Threat 
and Analysis Center public health analyst. 
8 28 CFR Part 23, The statutory authorities for 20 CFR Part 23, as stated in 1993 Revision and 
Commentary, are section 801(a) and section 812(c) of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, as amended, (the Act), 42 U.S.C. 3782(a) and 3789g(c).  The Act provides for 
confidentiality of information as follows: … “(d) Any person violating the provisions of this section, or of 
any rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder, shall be fined not to exceed $10,000, in addition to any 
other penalty imposed by law.”  
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described is not technically classified, it does contain limiting distribution instructions. 
As a result, the intelligence community will still be able to restrict distribution by 
including special instructions on documents labeled “law enforcement sensitive” or other 
such handling instructions. 
As mentioned previously, the health and medical communities also maintain 
internal information silos. These can include human disease surveillance data within the 
community of epidemiologists, hospital bed status within the community of hospital 
administrators, animal disease surveillance data with animal control or veterinary science 
specialists, and threat information with intelligence analysts. Nevertheless, intra-
disciplinary information hording must be eliminated. Truly, to develop qualia regarding 
the health threat, information sharing and collaboration must be improved. 
The creation of information silos results in a cost to the public health and medical 
community through an inability to develop a true understanding of the health threat. This 
failure creates second and third order consequences relative to insufficient or inadequate 
planning and equipping of the community to meet these threats, and such inadequate 
preparation could certainly cost lives. 
There are likely to be as many solutions to the problem of maintaining 
information silos as there are state and local jurisdictions. However, the crux of the 
problem is the need to build a collaborative capacity within each organization. Thomas, 
presents success factors that they observed in a study on inter-organizational 
collaboration, which can be applied to the intra-organizational setting as well. At least 
25% of the participants agreed a “felt need” to collaborate, and a common goal or 
recognition of interdependence contributed greatly to success. Other factors considered 
important by participants were social capital, such as interpersonal networks, and 
effective communication and information exchange. Lastly, participants felt that 
incentives, such as collaboration as a prerequisite for funding, coupled with strong 
leadership support were also important (Thomas, Hocevar and Jansen, 2008, p. 6). 
Although 25% of the participants did not mention trust and competency, other literature 
indicates the importance of these two factors in reducing intergroup rivalry and  
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developing strong information sharing practices (Kleinbaum and Tushman, 2008, p. 6). 
The organizational design components for ensuring information sharing success include 
the following. 
• a common purpose 
• a formalized structure to ensure information sharing, such as routinely 
scheduled meetings and committees 
• the ability to share information laterally through technology and 
interpersonal means 
• incentives 
• personal attributes, such as competency, commitment, and social trust 
(Thomas et al., 2008, p. 6) 
2. What Should be Reduced? 
Because of the lack of information sharing internal and external to the public 
health community, duplication of effort often exists. In order for a public health 
intelligence analyst to develop an accurate health threat assessment, access to information 
regarding the number of data inputs annotated in the model is essential. Without routine 
access to this information, each possible unusual occurrence will require research into the 
data, actions that both duplicate efforts and expend valuable time that could be used to 
develop an appropriate prevention or response. 
Duplication of effort or redundancy often results from low trust situations. Covey 
describes the attributes of low trust organizations, which include situations where people 
do not share information freely; instead, they hoard information, new ideas are openly 
resisted, “meetings after the meeting” occur frequently, people feel unproductive tension 
and sometimes fear (Covey and Merrill, 2006, p. 237). Because of the lack of information 
sharing due to low trust situations within an organization, individuals will seek out 
information they need from alternate sources, which results in an unnecessary 
expenditure of resources. The cost of this duplication of effort creates an unnecessary tax 
on the organization (Covey and Merrill, 2006, p. 250).  
In the public health and medical field, the diverse nature of myriad of specialties 
involved also can create communication barriers. Highly specialized individuals, by their 
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nature, are likely to be dysfunctional because of their diversity and their differences in 
terminology and perspective (Polzner, 2008, p. 20). These communication barriers are 
likely to result in low trust situations due their divergent goals, territoriality, and 
competition for resources (Thomas et al., 2008, p. 6). 
Because of duplication of effort and lack of information sharing, research may 
result in incomplete information gathering giving the analyst an inaccurate picture of the 
situation. As mentioned under information silos, this incomplete or inaccurate 
understanding may cost lives through a lack of adequate preparedness. 
The solution for developing high trust organizations capable of minimizing 
duplication of effort relies on implementation of processes that overcome the barriers that 
obstruct information sharing. Kleinbaum and Tushman (2008) suggest investment in idea 
brokers within the organization. Creating situations in which these individuals can 
interact may foster the development of relationships across the organization. Such actions 
help develop the informal networks within the organization as a means of influencing 
social interaction on a positive scale rather than allowing it to operate at the negative end 
of the spectrum (pp. 26-27). Numerous authors suggest the development of incentives 
and rewards for horizontal and vertical information sharing (Thomas et al., 2008, p. 2; 
Howes and Quinn, 1978, p. 73; Fisher et al., 2008, p. 47). 
3. What Should be Raised above Industry Standard? 
This research is replete with documentation of the need for collaboration.  
Collaboration through interagency partnerships is particularly valuable because of the 
different perspectives that can be brought to bear during analysis when varieties of 
disciplines are involved in the process. By tapping into social, trust-based networks, the 
knowledge community gains access to both tacit and explicit knowledge (Von 
Kortzfleisch, Margel, and Proll, 2007, p. 3). Brafman and Beckstrom (2006) make the 
analogy that the best organizational design for optimizing this type of information flow is 
that of a starfish as opposed to that of a spider. The starfish organization represents a 
network of nodes that will continue to thrive if a leg (network node) is cutoff. However, 
as with a spider, representative of a hierarchical organizational structure, if the head is cut 
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off, the organization dies (pp. 34-35). One aspect of starfish organizations is that they 
usually have informal leaders known as catalysts (pp. 34-35). The power of these 
individuals is that by having connections across multiple network nodes, they have the 
effect of bringing them together (Gladwell, 2000, p. 51).  
In this aspect, the power of social networks can be substantial. However, 
knowledge is power and sharing information means sharing of power. Because of this, 
knowledge management is highly political.  In order to be successful, it requires an astute 
manager to cultivate both the political aspects as well as the informal, trust-based, social 
aspects of information sharing (Davenport, 1997, p. 188). The greater the social trust in 
the organization, the less likely politics will have a significant impact on information 
flow (Covey and Merrill, 2006, p. 251). 
Increased collaboration results in an increase in situational awareness.  Hansen 
and Nohria (2006) discuss the value creation that results from collaboration. Among the 
five major categories are the following.  
• Better decision making as a result of advice and information obtained 
from colleagues 
• Innovation through cross-pollination of ideas and recombination of scarce 
resources 
• Enhanced capacity for collective action by dispersed units (p. 5) 
Increased situational awareness and collaboration provide analysts with increased 
information sets, which may result in a more comprehensive threat assessment. The 
greater the detail in the threat assessment, the better the decision maker will be able to 
develop appropriate protective measures for his workforce or the population in general. 
The value created through collaboration lies not only within the public health and 
medical community, but also between public health and other interagency disciplines as 
they gain a greater understanding of the implications of various health threats and the 
necessary precautionary measures leadership can take to protect the workforce. Although 
initial efforts in collaboration require some degree of trust, the value proposition is that, 
as we have already discussed, with continued collaboration, the ability to protect the  
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workforce increases. Increased collaboration and information sharing “are self-
strengthening and reinforcing” (Boselego, 2005).  This then becomes a cyclic value in the 
process. 
4. What Should be Created that Has Never Been Offered Before? 
An environment of operational synergy results from trust and information sharing.  
Schoenberg (2001) presents the concept that operational synergy is comprised of resource 
sharing and knowledge transfer in business acquisitions. These two components 
contribute to value creation because of the synergistic results of these two components (p. 
101). The American Heritage Dictionary defines synergy as “the interaction of two or 
more agents or forces so that their combined effect is greater than the sum of their 
individual effects, and, cooperative interaction among groups, … that creates an 
enhanced combined effect” (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English 
Language, Fourth Edition, 2004). Applying this same concept to the realm of 
intelligence, operational synergy results when two or more agencies transfer knowledge 
and share information resources through some type of information sharing process and/or 
technology.  
As the cycle continues, analysts become better-informed resulting in improved 
health threat qualia. This operational synergy and qualia surrounding the health threat are 
value innovations that are not currently part of the intelligence community. 
A summary of this four-factor framework, as it relates to the development of a 




Figure 9.   Four-Factor Framework for a Health Threat Assessment Strategy. (From: 
Kim and Mauborgne, 2005, p. 29) 
The layout of this strategy comparing current practice to the value innovation of 
the development of a health threat assessment is depicted in the strategy canvas in Figure 
10. Note the expected improvement in the ability to develop an effective health threat 
assessment with increase information sharing and collaboration. 
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Figure 10.   Health Threat Assessment Strategy Canvas. (From: Kim and Mauborgne, 
2005, p. 29) 
C. OPPORTUNITIES 
This strategy emphasizes the value derived from development of information 
sharing knowledge management systems based on trust and collaboration. The process to 
reach this goal requires a combination of information technology, changed behaviors 
regarding information documentation (Smith and McKeen, 2004, p. 25), and changes in 
information sharing culture (Fisher et al., 2008, p. 27).  
1. Federal Emphasis 
In recent months, the federal government has placed emphasis on the 
development of several efforts to integrate health data streams. These initiatives, although 
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not currently producing information for consumers at the state and local levels, signal that 
the timing is right for development of similar initiatives at the state and local levels. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is developing several initiatives 
including BioPhusion. The name of the program plays off the concept of integrating 
public health with the traditional intelligence concept of fusion. This program intends to 
integrate the meta-analysis, often thought of as disease or syndromic surveillance, with 
real-time incident data (Rolka et al., In Press, p. 5). 
The Department of Homeland Security has also begun development of an 
initiative called the National Biosurveillance Integration Center. According to Myers, the 
Center’s Director, the Center’s mission is to “integrate and fuse [information] across the 
domains of health…human, animal, plant and environmental, and apply that to a national 
security perspective via the nation’s critical infrastructure” (Eric Myers, personal 
communication, October 15, 2008, Denver, CO, at the Health Security Intelligence (HIS) 
Workshop). The Department also held the Health Security Intelligence (HIS) Workshop 
in Denver, Colorado from October 14 through 16, 2008. This workshop was held to 
determine the state of public health information fusion occurring at the state and local 
levels, and the desired products that the Department of Homeland Security could produce 
for state and local agencies. 
The Defense Intelligence Agency has also altered its operations in a new 
initiative. The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center has recently been renamed as 
the National Center for Medical Intelligence. Although its primary focus is still overseas, 
the analysis now includes overseas health threat implications to the United States 
(Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 2008, p. 1).  With the expansion of its mission, the 
National Medical Intelligence Center has also changed its policy regarding access to its 
unclassified information and has now moved to Intelink-U, thus making make it easier 
for customers to access their Web site. Users from .mil and some .gov domains do not 
need to apply for an account (Department of the Army, Fort Detrick, 2008). 
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2. Economic Downturn 
While a period of economic crisis may not appear to be the ideal time to launch a 
new initiative, the public health implications of the crisis make this a critical time to do 
so. On November 15, 2008, the headlines of the Washington Post were, “Experts See 
Security Risks in Downturn. Global Financial Crisis May Fuel Instability and Weaken 
U.S. Defenses” (Warrick and Tate, 2008, pp. A1, A9). The implications in the story are 
that terrorism experts see al-Qaeda viewing the economic conditions in the United States 
as a sign of weakness, thus making it an ideal time for attack. However, another 
implication that is not quite as explicit is captured in the text below the adjacent photo of 
a group of Pakistani women “Pakistanis receive handouts of food at a shrine in Islamabad 
this week. Soaring food prices have sparked unrest” (Masood, 2008, p. A9). The public 
health implication not stated here is that extreme poverty contributes to increased disease 
rates in populations and decreased reporting, which means we may not be able to track 
the next global health threat as it spins its way around the globe. These conditions make 
the present an ideal time to launch efforts at building support for health threat 
assessments at the state and local levels. In the District of Columbia, the Washington 
Regional Threat and Analysis Center (WRTAC) is supportive of the effort to produce 
separate products geared toward specific audiences, including the health and medical 
community as well as the fire and emergency medical services communities. 
D. CHALLENGES 
While current opportunities may make this an ideal time to forge ahead with new 
initiatives in the intelligence world, such as the development of a health threat assessment 
model for use at state and local levels, there are still many challenges to implementing the 
strategy. 
1. Trust 
In his book, The Speed of Trust, Covey and Merrill (2006) open with a discussion 
of the importance of trust. They refer to several types of trust, including organizational 
trust, societal trust and market trust (pp. 237-245, 304-305). Trust is the one thing, they 
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say, that is common to every relationship whether it is personal or business-related. 
Moreover, if that trust is destroyed, the relationship will disintegrate (p. 1). This could not 
be truer than in the intelligence community. Information gathering, and therefore 
information sharing, is the tradecraft of intelligence analysts. However, since analysts are 
rarely the generators of information, they must rely on others to provide them with that 
information. Trust is critical in this exchange of information. Cooper (2005) states that 
investigations into intelligence failures cite information sharing problems as being the 
crux of the issue. The recommendations for improving information sharing were to 
establish new authorities mandating information sharing and new information 
technology. However, he advises that “effective collaboration is fundamentally a matter 
of culture and values; what is needed is…to forge expert social networks and effective 
‘distributed trust’ systems” (pp. 55-56). 
As may be seen from the previous discussion of the FBI’s restriction on the 
release of threat assessments with obvious implications to the public health community, 
there is still a significant need for improvement in the degree of trust between federal 
government law enforcement agencies and non-law enforcement, state-level agencies.  
2. Collaboration 
a. Technology 
One of the more difficult problems with implementation of new 
information technology concepts is the “hype cycle.” The Gartner Group documents four 
phases of acceptance after the initial launch of “the good idea trigger.” The first phase 
ends with the peak of inflated expectations. A drop quickly follows to almost pre-launch 
acceptance levels, referred to as the trough of disillusionment, which results from the 
realization that the project will not be the solution for all problems. Management may 
respond with renewed emphasis on the value of the project or adjust the original project 
plan, which results in a gradual increase in acceptance, termed the slope of 
enlightenment. With continued emphasis and adjustment, the project concept will 
continue to rise until a plateau of productivity is reached. Smith and McKeen (2004) 
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state, “Long-term sustainable value can only occur by reassessing and reevaluating what 
needs to be done to address the problems and complexities involved and to refocus on 
ways that will simplify and add value” (p. 27).  Figure 11 depicts the hype cycle. 
 
Figure 11.   Gartner Hype Cycle. (From: Smith & McKeen, 2004) 
b. Social Network 
In The Hidden Power of Social Networks, by Cross and Parker (2003), the 
authors discuss that the value of a network lies in understanding two aspects of it; first, 
who knows what and second, how to get access to them (pp. 36-37). In the evolving 
technological world of the intelligence cycle, it does not matter how much any individual 
knows, if no one else knows that they know it. This is why the social network is so 
important. The information sharing of the social network relies on the relationships that 
have been built and the attitude toward knowledge sharing (Chow and Chan, 2008, p. 
462). According to Wasko and Faraj (2005), in the information technology arena, 
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Organizational members benefit from external network connections 
because they gain access to new information, expertise, and ideas not 
available locally, and can interact informally, free from the constraints of 
hierarchy and local rules. Even though the employing organizations may 
be direct competitors, informal and reciprocal knowledge exchanges 
between individuals are valued and sustained over time because the 
sharing of knowledge is an important aspect of being a member of a 
technological community. (p. 36) 
In the intelligence world, social networks are somewhat different from 
ordinary business or industry, because knowledge is their sole stock in trade and that 
knowledge is vital to ongoing investigations and other homeland security issues. 
Therefore, relationships in the intelligence world are based on a degree of trust, which 
must exceed that of most business relationships. Therefore, the problem becomes the 
ability of connectors to link other individuals together in such a way as to pass on that 
trust. One recommendation by Cooper (2005) is the use of journeymen who have had 
years of experience in the intelligence field to act as mentors and guides for junior 
analysts and those outside the traditional intelligence community (pp. 51, 56). Another 
recommendation is a complete restructuring of the security clearance structure making 
security clearances universal in order to facilitate information sharing across the 
intelligence community (p. 57).  
3. Privacy 
The collection of information about an individual’s health status by governmental 
agencies who then further share that information with other agencies may raise concerns 
among consumer advocacy groups. Although significant steps have been taken on the 
part of public health officials to de-identify data, there is a possibility that when health 
data is combined with law enforcement or other governmental databases, the ability to 
identify the individual may be possible. An example of a public health information 
system in which privacy concerns are substantially addressed is the ESSENCE II system.  
ESSENCE II is a syndromic surveillance system that allows for daily analysis of 
outpatient data from District of Columbia area military and civilian treatment facilities 
(Lewis et al., 2002, p. 181). Because of the need to maintain individual privacy, Johns 
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Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, the developers of the system, considered the 
process of “anonymization” in the development of the ESSENCE II system. Lombardo 
(2003) provides an excellent discussion of “anonymization” or de-identification of the 
various data categories due to their sensitivity. There are three data categories, namely 
traditional surveillance data, nontraditional clinical, and nontraditional nonclinical. The 
only category that requires anonymization is the nontraditional clinical data (p. 329). 
Samarati and Sweeney (Unpublished) developed a process known as k-anonymity 
to protect patient privacy. This process acknowledges that even though data may have 
had names and social security numbers removed, someone could still trace patient 
identification through comparison with other publicly available sources. K-anonymity is 
“the degree of protection of data with respect to inference by linking data.” In their 
process, data is de-identified through suppression of data fields and generalization of 
data. Because of this detailed de-identification of data, the data collection and use 
complies with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 
In addition, all surveillance systems within public health are now required to be 
Public Health Information Network (PHIN) compliant. The Public Health Information 
Network (PHIN) is a major initiative from the Centers for Disease Control (2008) to 
provide standards-based disease reporting and public health information management. 
PHIN 2.0 requires that each state “ensure that its electronic information systems … are 
secure and available at all times and the information contained is only accessed or used 
by authorized users for authorized purposes.”  This access restriction as well as restriction 
from patient identity ensures individual privacy while still providing an extensive system 
of disease surveillance. 
Although no system is 100% secure, ESSENCE II has attempted by design to 
prevent SQL Injection from being possible. Data collection is done using Secure FTP 
(SFTP) or HL7 over secure virtual private network (VPN) tunnels. However, if intrusion 
does occur, ESSENCE II logs user activity that can be used for follow-up investigations 
of potential break-ins (Rekha S. Holtry, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab, personal 
communication, 2008). 
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All future systems designed for information sharing of individual patient 
information must also meet this level of effort of privacy protection to reassure the public 
that analysts will not compromise their health information in the intelligence 
development process. 
4. Urban vs. Rural Availability of Resources 
Another challenge to the development of a health threat assessment at the state 
and local level is that of the differences in availability of data in rural verses urban areas. 
Rural areas often do not have automated outpatient patient data from hospitals or real-
time reporting systems. The method of reporting may be in manual format, originating 
with the individual health-care provider or local hospital, passing through the local health 
department, which then processes the information within a specified period per the states 
reporting guidelines, before passing it up to the state level (Kraig Humbaugh, Director of 
the Division of Epidemiology and State Planning for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
personal communication, October 2, 2008, Seattle, WA at the Director’s of Public Health 
Preparedness Conference). This process, however, can vary widely depending on the 
state. In the District of Columbia, required reporting times vary from two to 48 hours 
depending on the disease while in Kentucky, the timelines vary from 24 hours to five 
days (District of Columbia, Reportable Diseases in the District of Columbia, 2008; 
Kentucky, Reportable Disease in Kentucky, 2008). 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an implementation strategy for the development of a health 
threat assessment. The strategy includes a four-factor framework for reduction of costs 
and increase in value. The factors that reduce costs include the elimination of information 
silos and the reduction of duplication of effort.  The factors that increase value to the 
organization through the value proposition include increasing interagency partnerships, 
situational awareness, trust, and the ability to protect. In addition, the value innovations 
to the organization are the creation of operational synergy and qualia.  
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Internal and external opportunities and challenges may affect the strategy’s 
implementation. Opportunities that may favorably affect the implementation are the 
current federal emphasis on developing biological surveillance systems and the economic 
crisis that may exacerbate disease conditions around the world. Challenges that present 
obstacles to implementation are overcoming the cultural issues that inhibit trust and 
collaboration between the intelligence community and non-traditional partners. Other 
challenges include the need for protection of data for privacy considerations, and the 
availability of information in rural areas due to limited automation of data streams. Public 
health officials must consider these opportunities and challenges prior to implementation 
of a process for development of a health threat assessment. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The IC [Intelligence Community] must transform itself into a community 
that dynamically reinvents itself by continuously learning and adapting as 
the national security environment changes. It has elucidated the principles 
from an exceptionally rich and exceedingly deep theory (Complexity 
Theory) about how the world works and has shown how these principles 
apply to the Intelligence Community. These principles include self-
organization, information sharing, feedback, tradecraft, and leadership. 
(Andrus, 2008, p. 6) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis contributes to homeland security through the development of a model 
for a health threat assessment. This model demonstrates the need for the public health and 
medical community to breach barriers that will improve collaboration across sectors to 
produce a more secure homeland. This can only be accomplished through trust, which 
must be developed through strategic leadership, complete transparency, and clarification 
of expectations in order to establish the consummate information sharing community and, 
thereby, qualia. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Individuals from the private sector and local, state, and federal government have 
validated the model for the development of a health threat assessment; however, further 
work is necessary. Based on the interviews and analysis conducted, I recommend policy 
development and future research in the following areas. 
1. Barriers to Information Sharing 
The intelligence community must eliminate barriers to information sharing 
between itself and non-traditional partners such as public health through relaxation of 
current distribution policies for “For Official Use Only” and “Law Enforcement 
Sensitive” products. The example of the Federal Bureau of Investigation denying  
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dissemination to public health departments information related directly to domestic 
terrorists’ capabilities to use chemical, biological and radiological weapons demonstrates 
the gap that the intelligence community must still close.  
2. Public Health Information Sharing Policies  
State and local fusion centers and health departments must develop information 
sharing policies that address health information concerns specifically. Carter (2005) 
emphasizes that “agencies must establish policies with respect to what types of data they 
will impart and to whom” (p. 3). Many of the interview participants at the state and local 
levels acknowledged that they did not have formal written policies for information 
sharing either internal or external to their agencies. While this appeared usually to allow 
for greater information sharing than at the federal level, decision makers appeared to base 
their policies on personal preference rather than routine or documented practices. Without 
formal written policies, consumer advocacy groups could view information sharing with 
other non-medical entities as infringement on personal privacy concerns. If not reviewed 
against documented criteria, agencies could inadvertently release information to entities 
that could use it against government officials. Therefore, state and local public health 
agencies should establish formal information sharing policies. 
3. Health Threat Assessment Products 
The Department of Homeland Security or Department of Health and Human 
Services should sponsor future research regarding the type, format, frequency, and 
content of intelligence products at the state and local levels for the variety of entities 
requiring health threat assessments. Considerations regarding the type, format, frequency, 
and content of intelligence products have been the subject of significant debate within 
fusion centers. NYPD SHIELD is an example of a product that is generally accepted as a 
good format. Most importantly, the aspect of NYPD SHIELD that makes it such a 
successful product is that it provides implications for New York City. 
However, most interview participants agreed that a single product would not meet 
the needs of the variety of audiences that should receive health threat information. The 
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implications for the jurisdiction are critical in each product, but those implications vary 
depending on the audience. The individual first responder has a need for immediate 
tactical information regarding the threat to their own personal safety; therefore, the 
frequency and method of delivery of threat information is likely to be more important to 
them than other entities. The private and non-profit sectors of hospitals and community 
health centers have a need for operational level information, likely geared toward their 
ability to diagnose and respond. Lastly, the executive level of government must receive 
more information related to strategic planning so that it can ensure that systems are in 
place to detect, investigate, and respond in order to mitigate casualties. Therefore, the 
solution probably lies in the use of a variety of formats for a health threat assessment. 
4. Technology for Facilitation of Information Sharing 
Department of Homeland Security or Department of Health and Human Services 
should sponsor research into types of technology that can best support the new 
information sharing and collaborative structure necessary for state and local jurisdictions 
to develop comprehensive health threat assessments. From previous research, it is likely 
that a suite of information technology solutions will be necessary for application within 
each state. Due to the recent trend in reduction of federal funding through both the 
Hospital Preparedness and the Public Health Preparedness Cooperative Agreements 
established within Department of Health and Human Services, upon completion of 
research and pilot studies, state level agencies must be adequately funded to support this 
initiative. 
5. Thresholds 
Department of Homeland Security or Department of Health and Human Services 
should sponsor research into a methodology for establishment of thresholds that queue 
homeland security professionals that an exception to an established pattern or a sentinel 
event has occurred. Since this is a relatively new field, the ability to draw on historic data 
at the state and local levels may be difficult, particularly in areas where data has never  
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been automated. Therefore, the study of algorithms or other mathematical models that 
could locate exceptions within a variety of information sources would be advantageous to 
those nascent in the intelligence development process. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The timing is right for state and local public health and medical agencies to begin 
to develop health threat assessments for their jurisdictions. Emphasis within the federal 
government portends the need for data gathering at the state and local levels. Because 
state and local governments are more apt to be able to understand the complex 
implications of the “street level” information that is available to them, they are in a better 
position than most federal agencies to aggregate, share, and fuse such information. In 
addition, due to the likelihood that information owners at the tactical level have 
familiarity and interdependent relationships with each other, they also share trust and a 
willingness to collaborate. Therefore, the development of health threat qualia is more 
likely to occur at this level.  
It is clear from the arguments presented in this thesis that health and medical 
intelligence belongs in the mainstream of the intelligence community in order for us to 
maintain a decision advantage, particularly at the state and local level where the 
intelligence developed will provide the most benefit to first responders and the local 
community. 
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APPENDIX A.  HEALTH AND MEDICAL INFORMATION 
SOURCES (NATARAJAN, 2007) 
Data Set  Currently 
Collected 
Priority Detection/Response 
Animal Control  Yes Tertiary Detection  
Radiation  Yes Primary Detection  
Nuclear  Yes Primary Detection  
Disease Surveillance  Yes Primary Detection  
Syndromic Surveillance  Yes Primary Detection  
School Health Surveillance  Yes Secondary Detection  
BioWatch  Yes Primary Detection  
Federal Government Sensors  Yes Primary Detection/ Response  
Department of Defense 
Sensors  
Yes Primary Detection/ Response  
Private Sector Sensors  Yes Tertiary Detection/ Response  
Veterinary/zoological   Yes Secondary Detection  
Agricultural data  No Secondary Detection  
CDC Quarantine Station  Yes Primary Detection  
Pre-hospital Care Diagnosis  Yes Tertiary Detection/ Response  
Poison Control  Yes Primary Detection  
Aeromedical Evacuation  No Secondary Detection/ Response  
Water Testing  Yes Secondary Detection  
Hospital Bed Status  Yes Primary Response  
Hospital Critical Asset Survey  Yes Tertiary Response  
Hospital Capabilities  No Secondary Response  
BioSense  Yes Primary Detection  
 72
Data Set  Currently 
Collected 
Priority Detection/Response 
Nursing Home  No Secondary Detection  
Air Sampling  Yes Tertiary Detection/ Response  
Occupational Health  Yes Tertiary Detection/ Response  
Background Illness Levels  Yes Primary Detection  
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APPENDIX B.  HEALTH THREAT ASSESSMENT SURVEY9 
 
                                                 
9 The original source for these questions was a survey designed in 2007 by Daniel Thomas who 
worked as a consultant for the Office of the Chief Technology Officer, District of Columbia Government 
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APPENDIX C.  INFORMATION PROCESS FLOW MODEL 
INTERVIEW - DATA COLLECTION INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
Thank you for taking the time to be interviewed.  You have been identified as a subject 
matter expert, supervisor, or someone who uses or collects health or medically related 
data in an operational environment.  This interview will be used to evaluate a model that I 
have developed to document the information process flow in the development of medical 
intelligence through with the final product being a health threat assessment. This type of 
assessment is intended to assist decision-makers in the determination of protective 
measures for both first responders and for the general public in order to safeguard against 
health threats whether they are terrorist related or as a result of natural conditions. 
 
This interview is being conducted pursuant to an approved thesis proposal for the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security Master’s Degree 
program sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  To comply with the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s policies and procedures, this interview must be recorded 
and a transcript of the interview made.   
 
Any information that is identified as For Official Use Only (FOUO), Controlled 
Unclassified Information (CUI), or Law Enforcement Sensitive (LEA) Information will 
be appropriately labeled and protected.  
 
The following questions are being provided to you in advance, so you can adequately 
prepare for the interview. 
 
1. For the record, please state your name, position, and agency. 
 
2. For background purposes, could you answer the following questions 
 
a.    What is the function of your organization? 
 
b.    What is your role within the organization? 
 
c.    What would you say your area of expertise is? 
 
3. Does your organization collect health or medically related data that could 
provide situational awareness regarding a health threat to first responders 
or the general public? 
 






5. Regarding data sources: 
 
a. How often do you access them? 
 
b.    How do you use the data?  
 
c.    Is it automated? 
 
d.    If so, how is it automated? 
 
1)    Commercial software? 
 
2)    Organization specific software? 
 
3)    Is there a product that is produced that could be shared with 
other organizations? 
 
e.    If it is not automated, how is it documented and tracked? 
 
1)    Electronically? 
 
2)    Manually? 
 
6. Does anyone conduct analysis of data for your organization?   
 
7. If so, what are the procedures exist for data collection, analysis and 
dissemination?  
 
8. If the data is incident related, how is the data disseminated as it relates to 
pre, during and post incident? 
 
9. Who receives the data? 
 
10. Does your organization conduct surveillance or modeling? 
 
a. If so, please explain to me the methodology that you use. 
 
11. Looking at the diagram regarding information flow in the development of 
a health threat assessment: 
 
a.   Are there other data sources not listed that you think should be 
added to the diagram that would be of benefit to the Health 




b.  Do you know who collects that data? 
 
c.   If so, do you know who they share it with? 
 
d.   Do you think that this accurately reflects a possible flow of 
information?  If not, what would you change? 
 
12. What problems and/or concerns do you foresee in the development of a 
health threat assessment as I have described it to you? 
 
13. What do you think that the benefits of a health threat assessment would 
be? 
 
14. Is there anything else you would like to add that I may have not mentioned 
today? 
 
15. What recommendations would you make to DHS to enhance or modify the 
sharing of health related situational awareness data as it exists today?   
 
Again, thank you for taking the time to prepare for our upcoming interview.  Please feel 
free to contact me if you have any questions.  I can be reached via e-mail at 









Senior Deputy Director 
Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Administration 
District of Columbia 
Department of Health 
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APPENDIX D.  INFORMATION PROCESS FLOW MODEL 
INTERVIEW - INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
Thank you for taking the time to be interviewed.  You have been identified as a subject 
matter expert, supervisor, or someone who uses or collects health or medically related 
data in an operational environment.  This interview will be used to evaluate a model that I 
have developed to document the information process flow in the development of medical 
intelligence through with the final product being a health threat assessment. This type of 
assessment is intended to assist decision-makers in the determination of protective 
measures for both first responders and for the general public in order to safeguard against 
health threats whether they are terrorist related or as a result of natural conditions. 
 
This interview is being conducted pursuant to an approved thesis proposal for the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security Master’s Degree 
program sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  To comply with the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s policies and procedures, this interview must be recorded 
and a transcript of the interview made.   
 
Any information that is identified as For Official Use Only (FOUO), Controlled 
Unclassified Information (CUI), or Law Enforcement Sensitive (LEA) Information will 
be appropriately labeled and protected.  
 
The following questions are being provided to you in advance, so you can adequately 
prepare for the interview. 
 
1. For the record, please state your name, position, and agency. 
 
2. For background purposes, could you answer the following questions 
 
a.    What is the function of your organization? 
 
b.    What is your role within the organization? 
 
c.    What would you say your area of expertise is? 
 
3. Does your organization collect health or medically related data that could 
provide situational awareness regarding a health threat to first responders 
or the general public? 
 
4. What data sources are those? 
 
5. Does anyone conduct analysis of data for your organization?   
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6. If so, what are the procedures exist for data collection, analysis and 
dissemination?  
 
7. If the data is incident related, how is the data disseminated as it relates to 
pre, during and post incident? 
 
8. Who receives the data? 
 
9. Do you interface with other health related organizations?  
 
a.     If so, is your interface on a formal or informal basis? 
 
b.     Is your interface for the purposes of sharing medical or health 
related information in order to provide situational awareness? 
 
10. What information do you OR would you like your organization to share?   
 
11. Who do you OR would you like to share the information with? 
(Coordinated with other Federal, Regional, State, and Local response 
partners)  
 
12. Is any of the data that you collect and/or share classified? 
 
13. What are your policies for information sharing? 
 
14. The diagram that I have provided you depicts an information flow model 
for fusion of health related information. 
 
a.   What are your initial reactions to the diagram? 
 
b.   The concept of fusion is somewhat amorphous. It has been 
described as the process of data sources to produce a concept that 
is greater than the sum of its individual data input. Do you think 
that this diagram accurately reflects the combining of multiple data 
sources for sharing with a number of jurisdictional partners to 
produce fusion? 
 
c.   If not, what would you change in the diagram? 
 
15. One method of sharing data in this manner is to use a wiki. Would you or 
others in your organization use a wiki or common server/drive to share 
information with other organizations?  
 
16. Are there any concerns that you or your organization would have for 
using/posting information to a “wiki” or common server/drive? 
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17. Are there any other data sources or organizations that you are aware of 
that would be of benefit to Departments of Health and Fusion Centers to 
provide situational awareness and development of health threat 
assessments? 
 
18. Is there anything else you would like to add that I may have overlooked? 
 
19. What recommendations would you make to DHS to enhance or modify the 
sharing of health related situational awareness data as it exists today?   
 
 
Again, thank you for taking the time to prepare for our upcoming interview.  Please feel 
free to contact me if you have any questions.  I can be reached via e-mail at 









Senior Deputy Director 
Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Administration 
District of Columbia 




APPENDIX E.  INTERVIEW CODING 
EXPERT COMMENT 
 
LAYERS / CLASSIFICATION 
EM What we have done in the National Biosurveillance Integration Center…is that 
we have clearances that are at all three levels of classification. So 
UNCLASSIFIED, SECRET and then TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 
COMPARTMENT INFORMATION.  And that is our attempt is to make sure we 
are going after those minute tidbits from the intelligence community, from the 
intelligence from information at all layers that can protect it…A critical piece of 
PCII, Protected Critical Infrastructure information from the private sector all 
wraps into that. 
EM I really appreciate the way you have depicted things…because this is trying to get 
at something that is not traditional laying it out … I think any layer could be a set 
of layers where you were able to explode this.  So, I find this to be very 
intriguing.   
THRESHOLDS 
BB [If] you selected measles as an agent, you need help…it doesn’t meet any of the 
thresholds to become an effective bio weapon. There is a high immunization 
status in this country …it is just not going to work. 
EM The process that we are doing … follows very much an analytic process … as 
data is coming in, it is a 24/7 operations for us so that we have a watch officer on 
the Department of Homeland Security National Operations Center floor, so that 
we are in the constant read screen, enter data, or watch data coming into the 
database and running queries against it. It is a very iterative type process. As 
opposed to let it run for three days and then we will take a look and see if we 
have an elephant, a snake or a giraffe. So, number one, introduce the analytic 
process early and often. And then, by setting up parameters what we do is … 
find what the facts are in the data, separate those from the assumptions and 
separate those from the analysis and try to keep those clear among the three. … 
what we establish … [are] critical information requirements - Classic CIR’S. 
With the … participants that are in the game already … setting thresholds, which 
is a stickler, to get those thresholds. But, when you have those thresholds, when 
you have decided what goes into reporting as opposed to monitoring, as opposed 
to halt … we try to make those decisions very keenly, based on time, space and 
resources. 
EM There were two aspects if you will. In my mind, there is a scientific aspect of it 
that says okay, this threshold is enough so that enough of the population, human, 
animal, plant, environmental, but enough of the population of things [that] are 
threatened by the spread of this disease. You take an extreme case like an H5N1, 
pathogen, and the statistics shown on the wall about people not showing up for 
work, and comparing it to the 1918 influenza, etc. The other aspect is operational. 
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So, we took scientific standards and from the “Bigs” if you will, Centers for 
Disease Control and the Food and Drug Administration, and AFIS and FSIS, and 
all of those component elements and said okay you have got to really help us set 
up first thresholds. By the way, these will be recalibrated as we go … 
Operationally, the DHS National Op[erations] Center, the NOC, brought together 
at least … 55 Op[erations] Centers in the greater Washington Capital Region and 
what they did was … established … [a] steady state, Phase I, II and III. They 
categorized phases … you go from a steady state, to a Phase I, II, III of increasing 
severity concern and danger and back to reconstitution, to a Phase I, and we tied 
our scientific thresholds to those phases … And what that helps with, rather than 
just being a scientific … but when you look at it from an Op[erations] 
perspective, and you say … if that occurs, the Secretary of Homeland Security is 
going to [have to] make some decisions.  People are going to be moving.  We are 
going to stop doing certain things.  We are going to do other things based on your 
agency and your mission …  Or, let’s say there is a significant terrorist attack, 
you know we are into Phase III. We went from steady state to Phase III…not only 
then how do you look at those two factors, but how do you look at it when you 
jump from a phase and completely over one that would let you gradually look at 
it to a cataclysmic type of thing. And also not forgetting the recovery at the end. 
Now hopefully, that is simple enough … to make it workable. I am afraid if you 
make the formula become much more complex … you don’t get anywhere. It 
becomes a theory and it becomes a study as opposed to practice.   
KH In Louisville, they have specific product, in other words, they have thresholds. 
And you can see a graph of [it], and they already know based on past data that the 
weekend of the Derby they are going to see just that many more ambulance runs 
… they already know there is going to be a spike but the question is, is the spike 
much greater than in past years on Derby weekend. 
KH If you are just looking at syndromic surveillance alone, that is not going to give 
you the whole picture, so…thresholds are artificially created. 
KH The issue is about thresholds because the thresholds are arbitrary. But, somebody 
has got to set the threshold. Then if it goes over a certain threshold … you have to 
look at … other data sources … and you have to look and say, are we seeing 
increases in any of these other types of data sources? If they start popping up, 
then I think you have to use common sense and say yeah, we have to go 
investigate this further. 
JD I’d love to see trend information about where is the flu in relation to our 
population, historically, and if it’s doing this tomorrow, it’s going to mean these 
many more people are reporting to emergency rooms.  Yes, and even 24 hours 
notice, I think, gives us an opportunity to maybe take an action, and I’m not sure 
what the action is, but we’ve never had that good information on things like that 
to allow us to try to adapt. 
COLLABORATION 
JG I was just talking to somebody today who was at the PHIN Conference who 
recognized one of my employees from the State of Florida who did a superb job 
in sharing the products that they have developed. And also, in the New Jersey 
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Conference two years ago, the Council of State and Territorial and 
Epidemiologist, one of my staff members shared a system that they used for 
disease recording mechanisms for the British Virgin Islands, which they were 
thrilled to tag on to our system and become a user in that. 
KH On the on the other hand we have not seen that there is a replacement necessarily 
for astute clinicians for us to spend all of the time and resources and we have 
those limited resources. There is also the issue of the partners and the 
collaboration that you need … we have had a struggle convincing homeland 
security that health data is an important part of what they call their fusion center 
… but I think they [think] of … intelligence from a law enforcement perspective 
only … I think it could be valuable if they included … health data in their Fusion 
Center but it is often difficult to overcome that barrier. 
EM Along with this entrée into the law enforcement, public health and intelligence 
triangles are starting to show up at the fusion centers.   
EM The integration [that] the NBIS is looking for is to be a … set of vector arrows or 
curves or swirls and I don’t think it is vector arrows. And I do believe it is curves 
and swirls, it is that analytic process. 
DECISION-MAKING 
CD Part of the beauty of what we are developing in the District is a multi-faceted 
approach to getting diverse information, all which has its own impact and 
importance to the community’s response to a disaster. The ED Connectivity 
Family Reunification project’s value is on taking a set of data, fundamentally a 
patient’s name and a set location and sending it to those persons who are going to 
be fielding the questions from the public looking for a loved one. The HIS 
system, on the whole goes much further than simply collecting patient 
information. And would allow a more insightful look into the state of beds in the 
District of Columbia, the state of available resources in the District of Columbia. 
Whether it is people or various types of things, equipment, supplies, medications 
and the like. So, really it is the combination of the two programs that would allow 
the Emergency Managers to have a teleconference to discuss the situation or 
certainly would provide some needed information for critical decision making by 
the senior policy group. 
DG I think you would have to make a decision whether or not you want to go with a 
model in which there is a central fusion cell or whether fusion would take place 
in general in a disbursed way and then what the requirements are to have a core 
fusion center. But, at some point beyond this large scale fusion of all of these, 
there would be in fact fusion models taking place at those levels. 
DG I think at some point there is the overriding of the pure WIKI process by having 
someone say wait a second this is right or wrong … as opposed to just allowing 
the information to be there. So … there is adding on of information in the 
equivalent of a WIKI without quality control up to a certain point.   
KH Who would ultimately make the decision? I think it is useful to have these 
different eyes looking at it, because … as I said before, how do I, how can I really 
interpret law enforcement data? How do they interpret health data? If I have them 
in the room, they can tell me how they interpret their own data. I can tell them 
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how I interpret what I would consider … the area that we have expertise in  … 
but somebody at the fusion center has to say ultimately, this is the path, the 
algorithm that we are following. It is just like when we have a suspicious 
substance it is in the field  … do we have the people who are trained there and the 
expertise to make the decision about is this a credible threat? Is there law 
enforcement there? Is there public health there? And, is the HAZMAT Team 
there? I really think you need all three of those people there to make a decision 
locally whether this is a credible threat. Because at the State Health Department, I 
can’t tell you whether something that happens four hours away is a credible threat 
or not.  
KH The question [is] about who makes this decision here, about is there action 
necessary or versus is there not any action and which pathway that you follow. 
Because somebody has got to be in charge. And, a lot of times … it is not really 
an incident yet, so … we are just talking about surveillance, there is not an 
Incident Commander. 
BB There needs to be a decision and there needs to be a decision to produce a 
product, periodically and put it in the system, so that the system is ready to 
receive the product and understand the context the product has been developed in.  
JD And with all those recommended actions ... it would almost seem that if you 
move the health threat alert, health threat notices, health threat advisories up to 
where assessment review is, that you could have  -- at some point, when you pass 
those on, especially ones that require action, it [should be] somewhere in there, 
… I liked that you’re recommending preventative actions somewhere and I don’t 
see that on this chart …But it may be out of the fusion realm too.  It may be out 
in the intelligence realm. 
JD Before it goes to government executives, health care sector and first responders, 
is there a point that it goes into a process that it assesses the criminality portion? 
… I mean, I see we have national threat intelligence.  But it almost seems like we 
may be missing something there. 
JD You have to be aggressive in your feedback collection too.  I mean, the Wiki 
can’t be responsible for the process.  Somebody has got to be responsible for 
managing it … And the Wiki could be the tool.  But somebody has got to manage 
the Wiki and in some ways, even sort the right winger out of it or left winger out 
of it and say, “Okay, this is an opposing view.”  And that same person should be 
responsible for chasing feedback. 
PRODUCTS 
BB Well that is, if this system is effective, it has to continually produce products. 
Right after 911, the original Office of Public Safety, before it became Homeland 
Security in the state was excellent. They put out some very good threat 
assessment information for healthcare providers and EMS and a lot of it, some of 
it was things that there was no new threat information on them but it was just 
good information that they needed to keep in the back of their mind … we were 
posting homeland security notices, particularly to hospitals, lesser to local health 
departments, mostly to hospitals, and we were putting out one every 60 to 90 
days.   
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BB in New York we divide the health sector into healthcare system and public health 
system. Often the alerts have relevance for both of them. Sometimes they are 
only relevant for one or the other. For instance, when we had the clandestine 
surveillance of the hospitals going on. Guys coming in as JCAHO, didn’t have 
any credentials, that really didn’t have much applicability to the public health 
system, but it had a great deal to do with our healthcare system. 
DG I think that first thing is making sure is the ability to develop the product doesn’t 
drive the product. It has to be a useable product. So, just for me to put out a 
weekly report that does absolutely nothing, looks great literally on paper, but it 
doesn’t solve any of the issues… and some ways when we developed our 
software, we were able to drive into the software development and the program 
manager said wait a second we need the user requirements. So I think the core 
issue for the Executive Summary is what are the user requirements that have us 
putting this out? Does it even need to be out? Then once it is put out, I think the 
question is, who does it get disseminated to and you sort of hope that when you 
develop the user requirements that helps out. I think the third aspect of it is, and 
this is one of the things that is always an umbrella over everything that we always 
forget, is the public information aspect of it. So, the question is now that you have 
got the information, number one, how do you get the information out if 
appropriate, but number two, how do you protect the information from getting out 
if it is inappropriate for it to get out, especially if you have a wide spread users 
group. So it is not only the information and ability to have it, it is the ability to 
control the flow of it. 
EM I saw intelligence here although national threat is one thing, but there is also 
street intel[ligence]. And accommodating all of that but intel]ligence] is one of 
the feeds. And your end product, I saw when you came to decision here was truly 
this knowledge factor. And if while we are here, there is no action necessary, 
[this is] what we are finding and learning, for example, with food and drug 
administration and melamine and Chinese products. New reports this morning, 
Chinese keep pulling products, and etc. There is a level in here where there may 
be no action necessary, there is a very important part of continue to monitor 
EM One of the things to the Intel[ligence] community, actually to any of the 
communities, we go after very vigorously is the tear line. Because we want tear 
line products. We want to strip method/sources off products. We will see 
something and say, give us tear line on that. So, then you can have things at a 
much higher level classification. You get the gist of it or the actual essence of it 
checking with the Intel[ligence] community about how they are distributing it, 
but then getting our permission for us to go ahead and reference it … we really 
need to get tear line more and more.  
NN Right now … some of the organizations do, so CDC as reports that go out, EPI-
X, and through those resources, the ATSCR, FDA, NIH have reports that go out, 
FDA has a lot that goes out through biological devices and for medical devices. 
Our immediate office does produce products regarding the situation reports and 
GIS products in relation to incident specific response and that information is 
shared, but we don’t current have a standard daily report. 
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NN There is a legislation or policy being promulgated in the Intelligence community 
right now that before any report can be released classified, it must be released 
UNCLASSIFIED and FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY first before the classified 
version is allowed to be release. And help to ensure that we are getting 
information out to the user. So, I think as long as that philosophy is being 
maintained. I think there is a value added to getting that out there. … I definitely 
see the value of a health threat assessment and I think a lot of people in the sector, 
once they realize what it is ... And, the only other concern I can think of is … the 
health  care sector is so diverse. You  know there is medical treatment as one 
component or healthcare delivery systems, but there is this entire aspect in the 
private sector of medical distribution, materials management, so and so forth, but 
I think also would see a value added to this and knowing how should they deal 
with their supply chain and what production should they increase and decrease … 
how do we make the product in a way that is useable to all of them. It may be a 
matter of creating different products or it may be a matter of tailoring some of the 
data, but, I think a lot of times we focus on health care delivery systems and we 
ignore this entire other aspect of healthcare that without them the delivery would 
never occur.   
NN I think the key thing of sharing of health related situations is that it needs to be 
shared. So, I think there is a lot of analysis of health information in various 
domains in the Federal Government within DHS, outside of DHS, I think there is 
significant amount of importance in getting some consistent analysis done and 
that the product actually make it out to the end user. The generation of products, 
regardless of classification that sits within …that created it is essentially useless. 
So, making sure it covers a sector and it is diverse and that it goes out there.  
EM Because our mission focus is early queuing and situational awareness, it goes to 
both the First Responders and the general public. The intent of what we are trying 
to do is that what we find is that 98% of our data is not only UNCLASSIFIED, 
but is often times derived from the press and so, there has been a great focus and 
effort on what is in the open source world, the Intelligence Community even in 
the last five or six years has really put a tremendous effort into open source  … a 
very slim portion of classified data. 
COLLABORATION / TECHNOLOGY / PRODUCT 
BB We produce a document called New York State’s policy on how to evaluate 
suspicious substance and packages with threats. It is an FBI, State Police, 
Homeland Security Office of Fire Prevention Control document … I send it out 
to these guys and … they all gave me different comments ... not ones that I could 
reconcile … So, I was doing the Wiki work and … finally just brought them into 
the room and said come on guys … here is a draft. Everything that could be 
reconciled has been reconciled. Here are the comments that we couldn’t 
reconcile, let’s have it out. And we did and we ended up getting the document out 
and it was very successful document. 
EM The Intelligence Community using the JWICS architecture puts out TS SCI.  So 
we have vehicles at all levels of classification to get things out. Which I think you 
know is important to have – that there are different vehicles. One of the things we 
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do in the UNCLASS[IFIED] products, if we have something that is referring to 
classified data, is you put a tag line, and those that can, those that have the tag 
line say that is going to be SECRET, that is going to be on HSDN.   
JD I like the concept of Wiki’s.  I like using them.  I also like them in the intelligence 
community.  I guess the question I have here would be how would you … in what 
context would you be using that?  Would that be an analyst using it?  Would it be 
the members of the community?   
REAL TIME 
CD In the context of a preplanned event and/or an emergency situation resulting in 
data collection, the data comes primarily from, or will come from hospitals 
emergency department registration process. Presently the system that is populated 
on the HIS requires that the data for each disaster patient is hand registered on a 
set template which is found on the coalition’s web page under a list category, 
however, it is anticipated by Spring of ’09 we will have a much more 
sophisticated and more immediate collection system at hand through what we call 
the ED connectivity project that is going on now. That project involves taking a 
platform, in our case it is anticipated to be the Microsoft Amalgo Program and 
dropping it in over seven participating hospitals IT infrastructure to parse out 
select patient data that is pertaining only to general registration. It is not 
collecting at present lab results, X-ray results, etc.  It is just parsing out name, 
date of birth, and admitting condition. The value of the new system is one where 
it doesn’t require any extra work. It is real time data and will be able to be seen 
by not only the contributing facility but also in a disaster situation which we 
would classify as break the glass in its nature, we would have that data released to 
the other contributing hospitals as well as the DC Department of Health as well as 
the DC Department of Human Services. The two agencies that have the lead 
responsibility for family reunification. 
DG I guess you almost have to take a step back from the manifestations of what you 
see and what caused those manifestations and so the question [is] … what feeds 
do we get that allow us to come up with what we are displaying that fall in the 
realm of medical intelligence and I do think we get feeds from the FBI, so we get 
the traditional intelligence. We get feeds from our first responders calls and part 
of our system is a system in which we have nodes of command centers that tend 
to be medical command centers, that tend to be co-located with EMS Services, 
EMS dispatch. So consequently, the raw data of a 911 call usually makes its way 
into our system almost real time … The other part is the communicable disease 
surveillance, which at least for the State of New Jersey, is not a pure connect. 
There is a time delay and sometimes an organizational separation that does, that 
has me hesitate in saying that is always a real time feed. Other information is just 
random calls that we will get … we are first responders for white powder 
incidents, so we would respond to those incidents which provide us raw data. 
And then we get the standard what the FEDS will send to us and other partners 
send to us which they feel are necessary to spread. Also, we have inter-agency 
working groups that not necessarily on a real time basis, but close enough to 
being useable provide us information that we can feed. 
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KH I think the bigger question is, [is] it collected in the real time situations so that we 
can really have real situational awareness? How timely is the data collected? 
Because three are many different health data sources that come into our central 
office there at the State.  
KH We have an internal kind of a direct line to many different agencies that are 
within what we call our cabinet in state health. So, that includes mental health, 
and mental retardation department. We also have what we call DCBS, which is 
our Department of Community Based Services and we are in the cabinet as 
MEDICAID. So, we can actually get data, although it is not that easy, but for 
instance within the last six months we now have access to the MEDICAID … 
Data Warehouse, so we are able to do queries on their data, so we can get health 
data. But again, it is not real time.   
WR A lot of what we rely on now are those systems that we have, like a health alert 
advisory network. But, what the Director wants to bring to the table, I guess 24/7 
monitoring of acute and chronic diseases for example and being able to respond. 
You know have predictive and preventive measures in place. 
POLICY 
DG For example, our software model, each individual has a degree of access when 
they are given access to the system. Which allows them to see or not see different 
components. Now the decision as to what access to give them, there are some 
generalized policies but there is a lot of the seat of the pants part of it, So, I think 
that we are a mixture of policies and feel with more of a … lesser reliance on 
policies because we haven’t fully developed then yet, not because there is not the 
need for it, 
QUALIA 
EM What you have is … all of this information. You have got the, agreed to, official 
descriptions of diseases, of those not in professional health. Maybe able to spell 
Tularemia, but they may not be able to tell you so what, and here they are trying 
to make a decision. And on the other side of your display is okay we have these 
facts and you start pulling in histograms, you start pulling in where are we along 
a time line that I can maneuver so I can see it start, grow, build, and are there 
models? Are there historic records? And if so it gives you the visual analytics to 
be able to see that whoa, whoa, this looks very similar to a case before or this 
doesn’t look at all like the last 10 cases or the last 10 events. What it is going on 
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